How the value divide is challenging Britain's two-party system

This article was first published on the Comment is Freed substack.

The 2024 election left British politics looking more fragmented than ever. Although elected with a large overall majority, Labour’s 35% share of the GB vote was the lowest ever for a government with any kind of parliamentary majority, let alone one of 174. 

Meanwhile the Conservatives, with 24%, recorded their worst performance ever. In combination, the two parties that have long dominated British politics won just 58% of the vote, the lowest ever tally since Labour displaced the Liberal Party as the Conservatives’ principal opponents in 1922. Yet the traditional third party of British politics, the Liberal Democrats, won only 12%, well below anything it (and its predecessor parties) secured between 1974 and 2010. 

The party was overtaken by Reform UK, whose 15% was the highest ever vote won by a ‘fourth’ party in the UK, while, at the same time, the Greens secured what for them was a record 7% of the vote.

This fragmentation raises an important question: is the century old dominance of British politics by two parties, Conservative and Labour, who primarily compete for the centre ground of British politics, at risk of being replaced by a more diverse multiparty environment? In this article we address that question by showing that the outcome of the 2024 election reflects a sharp values division which means the Conservatives and Labour can no longer expect to win elections simply by occupying the centre ground.

A conceptual map of the British electorate 

During the election, the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) unveiled a conceptual map of the British electorate based on a wealth of data collected by the 2023 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey. Some readers may recall our previous guest post on Comment is Freed in which we presented six voter types into which, according to our analysis, the British public could usefully be divided. Here is a brief refresher of this map. We will then show the very different ways in which the six groups voted.

Well-off Traditionalists (12%) have previously been a core supporter group for the Conservatives party. They are interested in politics, do not like tax and spend, and are concerned about immigration. This group is more likely to be older, white, identify as both British and religious, and to describe themselves as being at the higher end of the social ladder.

Left-Behind Patriots (15%) are proud of Britain’s history but not so much of its present. They are critical of equal opportunities policies, believe in stricter sentencing, but also tend to agree that the better off are not taxed enough. Indeed, many of them struggle financially, tend to believe most people cannot be trusted and are disenchanted with politics.

Apolitical Centrists (17%) are unlikely to back a change of policy in any direction. They tend to believe that levels of immigration and welfare spending are about right. They tend to be slightly younger and less financially comfortable. They have little interest in politics and mostly do not pay much attention to the news.

Middle Britons (26%) are the biggest of our six groups. They believe ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth, but do not show strong support for tax and spend policies. They believe we need to be tough on crime and are slightly concerned about immigration. They are not especially interested in politics.  

Soft-Left Liberals (14%) are often relatively well-off university educated professionals who, nevertheless, are centrist on economics. They are, however, markedly liberal on social issues, as illustrated by a strong belief in civil rights and marked support for immigration. They are often interested in politics but are not necessarily committed to any one party.

Urban Progressives (16%) are both left-wing on economic issues and liberal on social issues. They want to see further action on women’s and LGBTQI rights, and anti-racism. They believe immigration is largely positive. Typically relatively young, many live in private rental accommodation in cities. They are engaged in politics and have previously been an important source of support for both Labour and the Green Party.

How the six groups voted

Shortly after the election, NatCen’s Opinion Panel successfully recontacted – either online or via phone – 1,783 of those who had responded to the BSA survey the previous autumn. This enabled us to ascertain whether and how those in our six voter groups voted in the election on 4th July.  Figure 1 shows the results, which have been weighted to reflect the demographic profile of the population and the outcome of the election.

Sources: British Social Attitudes (BSA) 2023 and NatCen Opinion Panel July 2024 except for the last three rows where % figures are of those who voted. Data weighted to actual outcome of the election.

The six voter groups fall into two almost equal but contrasting halves. First, there are three groups, the well-off traditionalists, the soft-left liberals, and the urban progressives, who, being more politically engaged, are more likely to have voted and who, consequently, constitute nearly a half (49%) of all those who voted. Indeed, despite the low overall level of turnout among the electorate as a whole (60%), as many as four in five (80%) well-off traditionalists – a relatively older group of voters – went to the polls. 

This group supported the Conservatives in large numbers. However, many backed Reform, while, in contrast, very few soft liberals or urban progressives joined them. Among these two latter groups it was Labour who were most popular. Yet the party found itself facing significant competition for their support from both the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. 

The other half of the electorate in the other three groups were, in contrast, less likely to vote – indeed little more than one in three apolitical centrists cast a ballot. At the same time, they were much more divided in their political preferences. As we might anticipate, the distribution of party support among middle Britons was the closest to that of the whole country, though Labour enjoyed a modest lead over the Conservatives in all three. That said, the Liberal Democrats, who are of course often portrayed as a centre party, were relatively successful among those apolitical centrists who did vote, while Reform were especially popular among left-behind patriots, a point to which we will return.

So, among half of the voting public, the Conservatives and Labour were not in competition with each other. Rather they were competing for support with one of the smaller parties – the Conservatives with Reform and Labour with the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. As a result, rather than having a system dominated by two parties, it now looks as though Britain has one that is characterised by two blocs of parties, with much of the battle for votes taking place within these blocs rather than between them.

Dynamics of support

This picture is confirmed if we compare how our respondents said they voted in July with the political preference they reported when they took part in the BSA survey in autumn 2023. No less than one in six (18%) of those who last year said they were a Conservative supporter voted Reform in July. This was by far the biggest movement of support away from the Conservatives. 

Meanwhile, Labour lost one in ten of its former supporters to the Liberal Democrats and another 5% to the Greens. In this instance, there were also marked within bloc movements in the opposite direction. As many as 27% of those who said last autumn that they supported the Liberal Democrats ended backing Labour, while another 9% switched to the Greens. Equally, 26% of the (relatively small) group of Green supporters ended up voting Labour, while another 16% switched to the Liberal Democrats.

As a result, although in the case of some parties there were marked differences between their popularity, as measured by BSA in the autumn of last year and how they performed in July, there was relatively little change in the combined popularity of the parties within the two blocs.

This is indicated in figures 2 and 3, which show the difference between the level of support for each party in each voter group in July and that registered by BSA in the autumn of last year. The figures reveal that support for the Conservatives fell most heavily among their core group of well-off traditionalists, but this was largely counterbalanced by a marked increase in support for Reform. We can see the same pattern for middle Britons. Meanwhile, although nothing like as precipitate, Labour lost some ground among soft left liberals and urban progressives, with the Liberal Democrats and Greens largely improving their position. 

Labour in fact lost ground most heavily among apolitical centrists but this too was partly counterbalanced by increases in support for the Liberal Democrats and Greens. This is also a group among whom independent and other smaller parties performed particularly well.

Source: British Social Attitudes (BSA) 2023 and NatCen Opinion Panel July 2024. Figures based on data weighted to actual outcome of the 2024 election. In the case of Reform UK, comparison is with combined level of support for Reform UK and UKIP in 2023.

Still, there is one group who do not fit this picture. Reform advanced most of all among the left-behind patriots. And while support for the Conservatives fell back among this group, Labour’s popularity also dropped heavily. 

Rather than being a collection of voters that lie in the centre on most issues, what distinguishes left-behind patriots is that they adhere to a distinctive combination of values – noticeably left-wing on economics but markedly conservative on social issues, a combination that is further laced with low levels of trust. 

Thus, while Labour might appeal to the group’s discontent on economic issues, Reform (and the Conservatives) can potentially to win them over on social issues. Heavily pro-Leave in the EU referendum, this group typifies the ‘left-behind’ traditionally Labour voter that the party struggled to retain in the wake of Brexit. Evidently, Labour again found it difficult to retain its support among this group, but with Reform the main beneficiary. This is one group where there does appear to be potential for significant competition across the party bloc divide.

Implications

None of this means the centre ground does not matter. Labour’s electoral success was founded at least in part on securing support among middle Britons, and to a lesser extent from apolitical centrists. However, it seems that elections can no longer be won simply by appealing to the centre ground. Only one in three (32%) of Labour’s vote in July came from these two groups, who are not only diverse in their preferences but also more difficult to persuade to go to the polls. Over half of Labour’s support (52%) came from its core group of urban progressives and soft left liberals. Yet the party cannot aim for the centre ground safe in the knowledge that there is nowhere else for its core voters to go: it has to fend off competition from the Liberal Democrats and the Greens.

The dilemma facing the Conservatives is much the same. In their case, just over two in five (41%) of those who voted for the party in July were middle Britons or apolitical centrists. As many (42%) were well-off traditionalists. But, despite registering high levels of support for the Conservatives, the group is increasingly attracted to Reform. Meanwhile, both the Conservatives and Labour find themselves in a battle with Reform for the support of left-behind patriots.

In contrast to their bigger rivals, both Reform and the Greens secured their record performances by appealing primarily to voters well beyond the centre. In the case of the Greens, over two-thirds (71%) of their support came from either soft-left liberals and urban progressives. Meanwhile, over half of Reform’s vote (54%) came from either well-off traditionalists and left-behind patriots. These performances may not be a sufficient foundation for them to be able to displace one or other of the Conservatives and Labour as Britain’s two largest parties. However, their ability to appeal to their respective niche markets is potentially sufficient to ensure that, in future, both the Conservatives and Labour will find the path to electoral success more difficult to discern. For now, both are in a world where they have to fight for votes on multiple fronts rather than simply with each other.