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Is Scottish Nationalism different?

This blog outlines some of the relevant evidence uncovered by the latest British Social Attitudes chapter.
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Today marks the publication of the final chapter of the 2024 (41st) British Social Attitudes (BSA) report, the rest of which was published during the General Election campaign. The new chapter analyses the character of national identity and pride, looking both at long-term trends across Britain as a whole and at similarities and differences between (i) England and Scotland and (ii) Brexiteers and supporters of Scottish independence. People’s feelings about national identity and their sense of national pride often feature in the continuing debates about Scottish independence and Brexit and, in this blog, we outline some of the relevant evidence uncovered by the chapter.

A claim often made by Scottish nationalist politicians, including ex-leaders of the SNP Nicola Sturgeon and Humza Yousaf, is that Scottish nationalism is primarily ‘civic’ in nature. In other words – it is a form of nationalism that is open and inclusive towards those who move to Scotland to live and work and which is comfortable with pooling sovereignty if necessary (for example through EU membership). However, is this conception of national identity reflected in the attitudes of Scots themselves?  And is their conception of national identity different from that upheld by those living south of the border?

One way to address these questions is to compare the conceptions that people in Scotland and England have of the national identity that they potentially share in common, that is, British identity. The most recent BSA and the most recent Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA), both of which were conducted last autumn, asked respondents how important they felt a battery of measures were for being ‘truly British’. Some of the options, such as respecting British political institutions and laws, reflect a more ‘civic’ conception, in that they are qualities that people can acquire during their lifetime irrespective of their background. Others, such as having been born in Britain, reflect a more ‘ethnic’ conception which emphasises familial background.

We might anticipate, given the claims made about the character of Scottish nationalism, that people in Scotland are more likely than those in England to put weight on a ‘civic’ conception of Britishness. This proves not to be the case. In fact, English respondents are more likely (86%) than Scots (79%) to say that it is important to respect British political institutions and laws to be ‘truly’ British’. At the same time they are more likely (70% vs. 59%) to say it is important to ‘feel British’.

That said, English respondents are also more likely to state that other more ‘ethnic’ qualities are important for being British. For example, 55% of people in England think it is important to have been born in Britain to be truly British, while 39% think it is important to have British ancestry. The equivalent figures for Scots are 49% and 32% respectively. 

A key reason why people in England are more likely to emphasise both ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ attributes is that they are more likely than those living north of the border to feel British. While 57% of Scots identify say they are either ‘Scottish not British’ or are ‘More Scottish than British’, only 23% of people in England who identity as ‘English not British’ or ‘More English than British’. And on both sides of the border those who identify as British are more likely to say that any attribute, whether ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ is more important to being British.

In fact, when a more direct question is asked about civic vs. ethnic conceptions of national identity, we find that the pattern of response is similar on both sides of the border. All respondents to both BSA and SSA were asked whether they thought someone had to be born British to be truly British (ethnic conception), or whether someone could become British if they made the effort (civic conception). Much the same proportion of English (67%) and Scottish respondents (63%) picked the more civic claim, while exactly the same proportion chose the more ethnic claim (19%). In short, people’s conception of British identity is primarily ‘civic’ in both England and Scotland, rather than being more ‘civic’ in the latter than the former.

But what if we ask Scots about their conception of Scottish rather than British identity? After all, that is the more popular identity north of the border and is the identity to which calls for independence appeal. However, there is no evidence that this is more likely to be conceived of as a ‘civic’ identity. True, the majority of Scots think someone can become truly Scottish if they make the effort (59%). However, as many as three in ten Scots (30%) think one has to be born Scottish to be truly Scottish. This is higher than the proportion of both English and Scottish respondents who think one has to be born British to be truly British (19%). 

But what about those Scots who support Scotland being an independent country? Do they, at least, have a different, more ‘civic’ conception of their national identity? And how do their conceptions of Scottish identity compare with then outlook of those who back Brexit. Is it the case, as SNP leaders have argued, that the nationalism that underpins support for independence is different in character from that which, for example, is to be found in the nationalism of those who back Brexit?
Supporters of Scottish independence are more ‘civic’ in their conception of national identity than opponents. Two-thirds (66%) of those who would vote Yes in another independence referendum agree that someone can become Scottish if they make the effort, compared with 52% of No supporters. At the same time, a higher proportion of No (59%) than Yes (50%) supporters think being born in Scotland is important for being truly Scottish, while 51% of No supporters but only 42% of their Yes counterparts say that having Scottish ancestry is important.

In contrast, those who support Brexit are more ‘ethnic’ than opponents in their understanding of what is needed to be ‘truly British’. A majority of those (across Britain as a whole) who now would vote against being a member of the EU (78%) believe it is important to have been born in Britain to be truly British, while nearly two-thirds (65%) believe it is important to have British ancestry (65%). Among those who would vote to become an EU member, only 45% say it is important to have been born in Britain, while just 28% say the same of having British ancestry. 

The different conceptions of national identity held by Yes supporters and Brexiteers is also reflected in their attitudes towards immigration. Supporters of joining the EU and supporters of Scottish independence are more likely than their opponents to agree with positive statements regarding immigration. In the case of the EU, 75% of those who would now join think immigrants improve British society by bringing new ideas and cultures while 70% think immigrants are good for the economy. In contrast, the equivalent figures for those who would vote against joining are only 36% and 29% respectively. Meanwhile, while a majority of ‘Yes’ supporters (65%) agree with both these statements, fewer than half of ‘No’ supporters do so (49% agree that immigrants improve British society, and 45% that immigrants are good for the economy).

People’s understanding of national identity in England and Scotland appear not to be that different from each other. In both cases they are predominantly ‘civic’. To that extent, there is a risk that claims that people in Scotland think differently about their identity may be overblown. But that does not mean that the politics of identity are the same. The nationalism that underpins Brexit (for which England voted but Scotland did not) is relatively ‘ethnic’ in character whereas that associated with support for Scottish independence is relatively ‘civic’. However, an independent Scotland would include all Scots, not just supporters of independence, and would, it seems, contain a population that is perhaps not quite as ‘open’ with respect to its national identity as some supporters of independence might hope.