Atlantic rift: UK and US attitudes on foreign affairs

The global landscape in 2025 is one of flux and instability. With conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, rising powers such as China and India, and the resurgence of nationalistic thinking, how countries deal with other nations – or ‘foreign policy’ as it is more formally known – is proving to be critical. Deciding a nation’s foreign policy approach might typically be the product of discussions among policy makers, military officials, analysts and diplomats. However, another key component is what the wider public thinks.

Earlier this year, the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) conducted a survey of UK public attitudes on a range of topics, including foreign policy. The survey utilised questions that had been previously asked in the US by the Pew Research Center and American National Election Studies in 2024, which allows for a comparison of views among the UK and US populations. This article explores the state of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic in relation to foreign policy, assessing where opinions are similar or otherwise diverge. It will also analyse how views differ by party support, with a particular focus on Reform voters and Trump supporters, given that Reform UK is now consistently topping voting intention polls in the UK, following a rise that has drawn comparisons with the success of Donald Trump in the US.

Before getting into the data, it is worth reflecting on the current state of foreign policy approaches in both countries. Starting with the US, since the end of WW2, it has played a role as the global leader of a rules-based liberal international order, supporting institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation, that aim to promote global prosperity, trade and peace. However, President Trump, in his second term, has pivoted the country away from this longstanding role, instead espousing an ‘America First’ approach to global affairs, with a greater use of hard power and coercive diplomacy, and the prioritisation of US national interest above all else. He has withdrawn the US from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organisation (WHO) and pulled back various American foreign assistance programmes. He has also taken a more combative approach towards longstanding allies, with trade wars launched on neighbouring Canada and Mexico, and the US’s commitment to NATO and European security regularly brought into doubt. On Ukraine, he has changed the US’s approach from that taken under the previous Biden administration, pushing for a swift resolution even it has meant offering concessions to Russia and opening up direct communication with Russian President Putin.

In the UK, meanwhile, prime minister Keir Starmer has generally taken a quite different approach. He has promised ‘steadfast support’ for Ukraine, working with European allies to maintain pressure on Russia and leading discussions on the creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to help guarantee long term peace. Starmer has even outlined that he is willing to put UK troops on the ground in Ukraine as part of this. More broadly, he has promised to ‘reconnect Britain’ to the world, for example, pursuing post-Brexit trade deals with countries like India, a ‘reset’ in relations with the EU, and a pragmatic approach in dealings with a more assertive US and China. The prime minister has also committed to boosting UK defence spending, outlining plans to raise spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. However, this has involved a cut in spending on foreign aid - a move that some argue has undermined UK global credibility. Reform UK, meanwhile, under its leader Nigel Farage, has pushed for a different approach on foreign policy, one which is more akin to that of Donald Trump. For example, in their manifesto for the 2024 General Election, the party proposed abandoning the Windsor Agreement and leaving the WHO, cutting foreign aid by 50% and dropping the target to reach net zero. And on Ukraine, Farage has been more critical about the conflict versus other mainstream party leaders, stating that the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU helped push Russia to invade. He has also ruled out sending British Army soldiers to Ukraine.

Considering these divergent foreign policy approaches being followed in both countries, where do the American and British populations currently stand? Do they agree with the stances being taken by their respective governments? Let’s first look at what the UK and US public think about taking an active role in world affairs. Taking an active role can refer to being proactive and engaged in the international sphere, as opposed to following a more passive or isolationist approach. It could involve the use of military force or economic measures like aid and sanctions, participating in multilateral institutions, or using diplomacy and other soft power tools such as culture to achieve national and global interests. The data reveals that a majority of people in both the UK and US broadly favour their nation following an active approach – around 9 in 10 Brits (91%) and Americans (91%) think that their nation taking an active role in world affairs is at least somewhat important. And around 6 in 10 in the UK  (59%) and over half in the US (55%) think that taking an active role is extremely or very important. It is notable that despite the push in recent years by some politicians, including Donald Trump, for a more inward-looking approach, there does not seem to be a widespread appetite in either the UK or US for a withdrawal from international affairs.

Backers of Trump and Reform, though, are less favourable towards their nation taking an active role versus other party supporters. Less than half of Reform voters (46%) think taking an active role is extremely or very important, compared to 6 in 10 Conservative (59%) and Liberal Democrat (60%) voters and 7 in 10 Labour (70%) and Green (74%) voters. Similarly, just over half of Trump supporters (53%) believe an active role is extremely or very important, versus 7 in 10 Harris supporters (71%). While Trump’s foreign policy actions, and Reform’s proposed ones, to move away from a more active role in the world will likely please their bases, they could prove more controversial among the wider public.

Figure 1 – Percentage who think it is extremely or very important for the [UK/US] to take an active role in world affairs

Following on from attitudes towards an active role, what do the public prefer when it comes to balancing the national interest versus the interests of allies? In international relations, there are two major schools of thought – realism and liberalism. The realist school argues that foreign policy is a hard power struggle in a chaotic and ruthless world, where countries should always prioritise their national interest. The competing liberal school is more optimistic and contends that peace and progress is possible, through cooperation with allies including through international institutions. When asked to pick between two statements that broadly align with each school, we see that most people in both countries favour a more liberal approach. Around 6 in 10 Brits (59%) and Americans (60%) prefer that their nation ‘takes into account the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with them’ over their country ‘following its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree’, aligning more with the foreign policy approach of Keir Starmer than Donald Trump.

Figure 2 – Percentage who think 'in foreign policy, [UK/US] should take into account the interests of allies even if it means making compromises with them'

However, Trump supporters and Reform voters do not share this view, forming the only partisan groups in their respective countries who do not favour accounting for the interests of allies. Only around one in three Reform voters (29%) prefer the UK to consider the interests of its allies, compared to over half of Conservative voters (55%) and 7 in 10 Labour (68%), Green (71%) and Liberal Democrat (74%) voters. Likewise, just 4 in 10 Trump supporters (40%) favour accounting for allies’ interests, versus around 8 in 10 Harris supporters (79%). Whilst backers of Trump and Reform are aligned on this – favouring a more hardline, realist approach – they do stand out from other people in their respective populations, who prefer a different approach on foreign policy.

Next, where does public opinion stand on having a strong military and whether it makes the world more or less safe. Having a large and mighty military can form an effective national tool of hard power which can be used to deter international threats, prevent conflicts and enforce peace. Looking at current defence capabilities, the US is a military superpower, ranking first in the world in military strength, with its annual $1 trillion defence spend accounting for 37% of total global military spending. The UK’s defence capabilities, meanwhile, are much smaller, ranking only sixth in military strength behind India and South Korea, with the nation’s armed forces recently described as ‘inadequate’ by a House of Lords committee. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the US’ bigger and more powerful military, the data reveals that nearly 7 in 10 Americans (69%) think that the US having a strong military makes the world more safe. The UK population, meanwhile, is more ambivalent with a half (50%) thinking a strong British military would make the world more safe, while over 4 in 10 (44%) believe it would have no impact on how safe the world is. 

Figure 3 - Attitudes towards impact on world safety of [UK/US] having a strong military

Looking at views by partisan support, Reform voters, unlike seen for the earlier questions, do not particularly stand out, with the 56% of Reform voters who think a strong UK military would make the world safer similar to the 53% of Liberal Democrat and 49% of Labour voters who think the same way. Although it is worth noting that Conservative (66%) and Green (29%) voters are respectively more and less favourable on this. In the US, however, Trump supporters (83%) are more likely to think having a strong military makes the world more safe, compared to Harris supporters (68%). Trump’s push for more robust military activity will likely have support among his base, and potentially among the wider US population too. However, with UK opinion more divided, the popularity of Starmer’s decision to prioritise the strengthening of British defence, at the expense of its international development work, is more under question.

Finally, what is the public’s view towards supporting Ukraine with weapons in its conflict with Russia, which has continued since the country was invaded in early 2022. Looking at the data, we can see that around half of people in the UK (52%) favour giving weapons to help Ukraine fight Russia. Support is less strong, however, in the US with just over 4 in 10 (44%) in favour of providing weapons. Crucially, a sizeable minority in both countries – one fifth in the UK (19%) and a quarter in the US (26%) – are opposed to giving weapons to Ukraine, while around 3 in 10 (28% UK, 29% US) are neither in favour nor opposed. Attitudes in both countries do not simply fall on one side of the debate, with opinion seemingly split between Starmer’s more supportive approach, ambivalence and Trump’s more isolationist approach. It is worth noting that the higher level of support seen in the UK could reflect its greater strategic interest in the conflict, with the invasion of Ukraine posing a wider territorial threat to European sovereignty in a way that doesn’t apply to the US situated thousands of miles away.

Figure 4 – Attitudes towards the [UK/US] giving weapons to Ukraine to help fight Russia

In line with what we’ve seen on other foreign policy issues, backers of Trump and Reform are aligned in their views, with support much lower among both groups. Just four in ten Reform voters (40%) favour providing weapons to Ukraine, compared to around 6 in 10 Conservative (57%), Labour (62%) and Green (57%) voters and almost 7 in 10 Liberal Democrat voters (67%). Similarly, in the US, just 3 in 10 Trump supporters (30%) are in favour of giving weapons, versus nearly 7 in 10 Harris supporters (67%). It is noteworthy that the UK public is more divided on Ukraine than some might assume. The UK has committed £22 billion in military and other support so far to Ukraine. Given public opinion, Starmer’s continued defence of Ukraine could prove a political miscalculation, particularly if Reform decide to challenge the current narrative.

Figure 5 – Percentage who are in favour of the [UK/US] giving weapons to Ukraine to help fight Russia

In sum, when it comes to foreign policy, there are some areas where we see broadly similar views among the UK and US public. For example, a majority of people in both countries think it’s at least somewhat important that their nation takes an active role in world affairs and also prefer that their nation takes into account the interests of allies, rather than just purely following their national interest. However, there are also differences between the two Atlantic nations. Americans are more likely to think that having a strong military makes the world more safe, compared to Brits who are more ambivalent, and, conversely people in the UK are somewhat more supportive of giving weapons to Ukraine than those living in the US. In addition, Trump supporters in the US and Reform voters in the UK hold starkly more nationalistic positions on foreign policy compared to their wider populations, with higher support among both groups for prioritising the national interest and a lower level of approval for taking an active role and providing weapons to Ukraine. Trump supporters are also more likely to think that a strong US military makes the world more safe. Overall, though, there does not seem to be a large-scale appetite among the UK or US public for a more realist or isolationist foreign policy approach, although it should be noted that support for arming Ukraine is more subdued than some might assume. Nevertheless, the more heterodox views held by backers of Trump and Reform does raise questions about how policymakers can bridge this partisan divide and also whether continued high polling by Reform could translate into the UK taking a different foreign policy approach going forward, including on Ukraine, especially at a time when China is rising in global power and influence, and major policy challenges such as AI and climate change require international action.