

# **Demographic Divides: What drives attitudes in the UK and US?**

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# Key Findings

- **Education and Religion** play a key role in driving right-wing support in the UK, whereas in the US right-wing support is shaped by a mix of additional factors such as ethnicity, age, gender and financial precarity.
- **Age divides people's attitudes in both countries** – but generational splits are sharper and more frequent in the US, especially on national identity and role of government.
- **Education divides attitudes on race and immigration** more strongly in the UK than it does in the US – people with lower levels of educational qualification hold more socially conservative views in both countries, but the gap between degree-holders and non-degree-holders is wider in the UK, especially on diversity and immigration.
- **Gender divides exist in both countries but are more pronounced in the US**
  - Men in both nations tend to hold more conservative views on issues such as gender roles, abortion and the size of government. However, these gender gaps are larger and more entrenched in the US.

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# Introduction

Last November, to coincide with the first anniversary of Donald Trump's election victory, NatCen published a report that compared attitudes across a range of issues in the United Kingdom and the United States. To determine how views compared on matters such as economic policy, immigration and social issues, questions that were asked by the Pew Research Center in the US just before the election were replicated in the UK using the NatCen Opinion Panel<sup>[1]</sup>. That report found there to be significant political polarisation in both countries. However, issues that divided the American right and left were not the same as those that divided the right and left in the UK. While there was sharp political polarisation in America on social issues like abortion and same-sex marriage, or economic issues like trade policy, in the UK there was generally a liberal consensus on these questions. In contrast, the divide between right and left in the UK was sharper than in the US on immigration policy and on racial and ethnic diversity, with UK right-wing voters holding more conservative views on these questions than Trump supporters in the US.

While the previous report focussed on political polarisation in the two countries, divides by party politics are not the only ones facing modern societies like the UK and the US. For example, previous research using British Social Attitudes data has shown that age and education have become significant dividing lines in party-political support<sup>[2]</sup>.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of the original report by focussing in detail on how attitudes differ by demographic background in the two countries. The first section is focussed on key drivers of right-wing support. Regression analysis is used to determine the elements of a person's identity or background that best predict whether they are likely to support either Trump in the US, or Reform UK / the Conservative Party in the UK. In the second section, we analyse the level of polarisation in the two countries by demographic variables that were not covered in detail as part of the original report, namely age, education and sex. Extending the analysis in this way will provide a deeper insight into the key drivers of political, social, and moral attitudes in both countries, and how they compare and contrast.

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# Trump and the UK Right – Similar supporters?

Our original report focussed on the political and social attitudes of Trump supporters in the US with supporters of the political right in the UK<sup>[3]</sup>.

Amongst other results, it was found that distinguishing attitudes among Trump supporters, such as a hostility towards free trade and a socially conservative outlook on issues such as marriage and abortion, were not as prevalent among supporters of Reform or the Conservatives in the UK. Meanwhile, on questions to do with immigration and race, supporters of parties on the right in the UK were more likely to have favoured a tougher approach than Trump supporters in the US.

That analysis focussed on the attitudinal drivers of support for right-wing parties in both countries, but what role, if any, does someone's demographic background play in their support or otherwise for right-wing parties in the UK and the US? And are the demographic key drivers of support the same, or is it the case, as with social attitudes, that there are different distinguishing features in the nature of right-wing support in the two countries?

To answer this question, we used binary logistic regression to determine the odds of someone supporting Trump in the US or voting for Reform/Conservatives in the UK. Multiple demographic details were inputted into the model<sup>[4]</sup>. An advantage of using a regression model of this type is that we can control for other demographic variables that may influence voting behaviour, to ensure we are measuring the impact of each variable independently. For example, the impact of level of education on voting behaviour is being measured independently of age, and vice versa.

Comparing results across the two countries, there are similarities in the direction of the relationships between demographics and party support / vote. In both countries, support for the right is less common among those from an ethnic minority background, those without a religious faith, degree holders, younger people, and people living in urban / suburban areas. However, there are differences in both countries as to the strength of the relationship

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between party support / vote and these demographics, and whether there is a statistically significant relationship between them when controlling for other factors.

Results from the logistic regression in both countries are presented in Table 1. Variables for which there is a statistically significant relationship between them<sup>[5]</sup> and party support are included in this table, while the full model results can be found in the appendix to this report.

To interpret the results, the 'odds ratio' column displays the odds of that group supporting either Trump in the US, or either Reform or the Conservatives in the UK, compared to the reference group. An odds ratio of above 1 means that they are more likely than the reference group to support the political right, and an odds ratio of below 1 means they are less likely to support them.

**Table 1 – Odds ratios of supporting Trump in the US and Reform or the Conservatives in the UK**

	Reference category	Odds ratio (95% CI)	P-value
<b>UK</b>			
Education: Below A Levels or no qualifications	Degree Holder or Above	2.14 (1.53 – 3.01)	<0.01
Education: A Levels or equivalent	Degree Holder or Above	1.98 (1.29 – 3.02)	<0.01
Religious	No Religion	1.82 (1.35 – 2.46)	<0.01
<b>US</b>			
Ethnicity: Mixed, Asian or Black	White	0.25 (0.19 - 0.32)	<0.01
Religious	No Religion	4.12 (3.34 – 5.08)	<0.01
Location: Rural Area	Urban / Suburban	1.98 (1.62 – 2.43)	<0.01
Education: High School Graduate or Less	College Degree or Above	1.83 (1.43 - 2.33)	<0.01
Education: Some college	College Degree or Above	1.28 (1.05 - 1.55)	<0.01
Age: 30–49	18–29	1.78 (1.17 - 2.70)	<0.01
Financial Situation: Just meeting basic expenses	Living Comfortably	1.64 (1.26 – 2.12)	<0.01
Gender: Man	Woman	1.40 (1.17 - 1.67)	<0.01

Starting with the UK results, someone’s level of educational qualifications and their religious background are two of the most important predictors of whether they will vote for parties on the right. A person with no educational qualifications had around 2 times the odds of voting for either the Conservatives or Reform UK than someone with a university degree or higher. This is independent of other factors, including financial precarity, so those without a degree are more likely to support right-wing parties in the UK even after adjusting for their financial situation. If one wanted to predict whether a person voted for parties of the right in the UK, knowing their educational

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background would give them a very good chance of making a correct prediction.

Religious faith also plays an important role in predicting right-wing support in both countries, though its influence is greater in the US than in the UK. Religious believers in the US had around 4 times the odds of supporting Trump than someone with no religion. In contrast, religious believers in the UK had just under 2 times the odds of someone with no religious faith of supporting a party of the right.

In addition to education and religion, in the US other demographic details play a significant, and independent, role in predicting party support. The most striking of these is ethnic background. People from an ethnic minority background were much less likely to vote for Trump than those who are White, controlling for all other factors. This strong link between ethnicity and party-political support is not one that is mirrored in the UK.

In the US, the direction of the relationship between level of education and party support is the same as in the UK. People with fewer educational qualifications were more likely to support Trump than Harris, just as those with fewer educational qualifications in the UK were more likely to support parties of the right than parties on the left. A person with a high school education or lower had around 2 times the odds of a person with a college education of supporting Trump. Right-wing movements in both countries share a common difficulty in gaining support among those who have been through higher education and obtained a degree. Unlike in the UK, however, in the US a person's financial situation was an independent driver of party support. People who said they were just meeting their basic expenses were more likely than someone who was living comfortably to say they supported Trump, even adjusting for their educational background.

Age, gender, and whether the person lived in an urban or rural area were also significant drivers of support or otherwise for Trump in the US. Those aged between 30 and 49 were more likely to support Trump than those aged 18 and 29, although after the age of 50 the relationship between age and party support becomes weaker and is no longer statistically significant when accounting for other factors. Meanwhile, support for Trump is associated with gender in a way that support for the right in the UK is not. A man has slightly higher odds of supporting Trump than a woman does, whereas in the UK a



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person's gender was not linked to party support when controlling for other factors. Finally, a person living in a rural area of the US had around 2 times the odds of supporting Trump than someone living in either a suburban or urban area.

In sum, right-wing support in America is driven by multiple, independent key drivers, whereas in the UK it is driven primarily by level of education. While education is correlated in the same way with right-wing support in both countries, in the US it forms one part of a broader coalition of drivers that includes financial precarity, gender, urban-rural location, religion and ethnicity. Inherent in Trump's support is a much denser mix of identities than we find among supporters of right-wing parties in the UK. The two groups are often compared, but, as with their underlying attitudes, broad comparisons between them mask differences in the identities of their supporters.

## The UK and US – Differing Divides

We have examined how someone's demographic background determines their propensity or otherwise to support right-wing movements in both countries, but what about social attitudes more broadly? Our previous report covered attitudes on topics including economic policy, gender and the family, and immigration. Political polarisation was evident in both countries, although the issues that divided left from right were not the same. In America there was greater polarisation on economic questions and gender and the family, whereas Brits were more divided on questions to do with race and immigration. We know these issues cleave a divide between left and right, but what about between young and old, between male and female, or between those with a university degree and those without? The purpose of this chapter is to extend the analysis of the previous report by examining how attitudes to these topics differ, if at all, by demographic background. And if these issues do generate polarisation between different demographic groups – is the level of polarisation similar in the UK as it is in the US? Or do we find differing divides?

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To answer these questions – we examine views by three demographic variables that we know have become increasingly important in determining social and political attitudes, and were not covered in detail in the previous report, namely age, sex and level of education<sup>[6]</sup>.

## Age

Previous research has shown the importance of age in shaping political attitudes in the UK<sup>[6]</sup>. There has been a longstanding divide in the UK between more socially liberal younger people and their older, more conservative counterparts<sup>[7]</sup>. This relationship is mirrored in American politics<sup>[8]</sup>, with younger voters more likely to support the Democratic Party and the Republican Party holding the support of older age groups. Therefore, across each of the questions asked, we might expect to find a similar division in the two countries, with younger people taking a more socially liberal stance than older generations on social and moral questions, immigration and economic policy.

On questions to do with social or moral issues, this expectation is generally realised. The direction of the relationship between age and responses to these questions is typically the same in the UK and the US. Take, for instance, attitudes towards social issues such as marriage. As shown in Table 2, 78% of UK 16–29-year-olds think same-sex marriages being legal this is a good thing for society, compared with 44% of those aged 65 and over. This gap of 34 percentage points is approximately the same as the gap between the youngest (55%) and oldest (23%) Americans' responses to the same question. As also shown in Table 2, there is a similar gap between the proportion of the youngest and oldest age groups who agree that 'society is just as well off if people have priorities other than marriage and children'.


**Table 2 – Views on same-sex marriage and prioritising marriage by age group, UK vs US**

	UK				US			
	16–29	30–49	50–64	65+	18–29	30–49	50–64	65+
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
% who believe same-sex marriages being legal is ‘good for society’	78	60	59	44	55	34	27	23
% who believe society is just as well off if people have priorities other than marriage and children	82	75	73	66	72	61	57	54

If we analyse other topics covered as part of the survey, however, we find that age polarises Americans more often than it does those in the UK. There is a gap in views between older and younger respondents in the US on subjects that is wider than the gap we find in the UK for the same questions, and for some questions the direction of the relationship is in opposing directions in the two countries.

For example, to gauge nationalist sentiment respondents in both countries were asked about perceptions of their own country in relationship to others, and on how important they considered it to be to discuss their country’s past successes and failures. On the first question, there are no significant differences by age group in the UK. As shown in Figure 1, around half (52%) of people stated there ‘are other countries that are better than the UK’, with a small gap between the proportion of 16–29-year-olds (51%) and 65 + year olds (46%) who thought this. In contrast, Americans are much more polarised on this question by age. Four in ten (40%) American 18–29-year-olds agreed that ‘there are other countries that are better than the US’, compared with only around one in ten (9%) of those aged 65 and over.

**Figure 1 % 'There are countries that are better than the [UK/US]' by age group, UK v US**




The generation gap is also different in the US and the UK regarding discussions of the nation's history. As shown in Table 3 – in the UK younger generations are more likely than their older counterparts to think it important to discuss both Britain's historical successes and its failures. However, in the US there is little difference by age on the question to do with historical failures, and older generations are more likely than those who are younger to think discussion of historical successes is important.

**Table 3 – Attitudes to discussing historical failures and successes by age group, UK vs US**

	UK				US			
	16–29	30–49	50–64	65+	18–29	30–49	50–64	65+
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Important to discuss historical failures	66	65	58	49	67	64	64	67
Important to discuss historical successes	61	63	61	53	62	63	71	74

On economic issues, we also find a greater degree of polarisation by age in America than in the UK. In both countries, the gap between older and younger respondents is generally in the same direction, though it is wider in the US. For example, as shown in Figure 2, when asked whether government ‘should do more to solve problems’ or whether ‘government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals’, older respondents in both countries were less likely than younger respondents to select the first option. However, at 21 points, the gap between younger (66%) and older Americans (45%) to this question is wider than the equivalent gap of 12 points for those in the UK.

**Figure 2 % ‘Government should do more to solve problems’ by age group, UK v US**



Similarly, there is a 17-point gap between the proportion of older (48%) and younger (31%) Americans who think 'Government aid to the poor does more harm than good', whereas in the UK older (44%) and younger (40%) people are more closely aligned.

In sum – age is a predictor of social attitudes in both countries, although it appears more frequently as a key driver of attitudes in the US than it does in the UK. There is a similar gap between younger people in the UK and the US and their older counterparts in their views on social issues such as marriage and economic issues like the role of government. However, perceptions of their country's place in the world divide American older and younger people in a way they do not in the UK, while older and younger adults in the UK are divided on the question of discussing their country's past in a way American adults are not. Therefore, UK and US adults may be polarised by age, but the nature and degree of that polarisation very much depend on the topic at hand.


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# Education

Previous research has shown the increasing role of education in influencing social attitudes. There is a societal divide between those who hold a university / college degree, who typically hold more socially liberal views and vote for left-wing parties, and those with fewer educational qualifications, who tend to be more socially conservative<sup>[9] [10]</sup>. This relationship between education and party support is one confirmed in our own data, as shown in the previous chapter. We also find this relationship in both the UK and the US data towards broader attitudinal questions, especially those to do with race and immigration. That being said, the level of polarisation by education is not the same in the two countries, and the gap in the UK is wider than it is in the US.

In both countries, people with fewer educational qualifications take a more conservative stance than those who hold a university / college degree. Figure 3 shows responses to two questions by educational level in the UK and the US. The first asked respondents whether they thought the country's population being made up of people of many different races, ethnicities and religions strengths or weakens society. The second asked whether white people declining as a share of the country's population is good or bad for society.

## Figure 3 Attitudes towards ethnic and racial diversity by educational level, UK v US




In both countries, those with a degree or higher were more likely to think diversity strengthens society and less likely to think white people declining as a proportion of the population is bad for society. However, at 34 percentage points for the former question and 29 points for the latter, the gap between those with higher and lower levels of educational qualifications is wider in the UK compared with the US, where the equivalent gaps are 20 and 9 percentage points respectively.

There is a similar relationship in response to a question that asked how far White people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have<sup>[11]</sup>. The same proportion of people (60%) with a university / college degree in both countries thought they do benefit either 'a great deal' or a 'fair amount'. However, just 30% of those with qualifications below A levels or less thought this in the UK, compared with 50% of those who graduated from high school or lower in the US.



On immigration, the pattern is similar. Respondents were asked whether immigrants living in the country without permission<sup>[12]</sup> should or should not be allowed to stay in the country legally. In the UK, the gap between the proportion of those with degrees or higher (36%) and qualifications below A-levels or lower (55%) who thought they should not be allowed to stay was 19 percentage points. In the US, the equivalent gap was just 8 percentage points (32%: college graduate; 40% high school graduate or less), as shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 4 Attitudes towards how to handle immigrants living in the country without permission / undocumented migrants by educational level, UK v US**



An association between higher levels of education and more liberal views is also found in both countries on questions to do with gender and family. For

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example, the proportion of degree holders in the UK (67%) and the US (46%) who think same-sex marriages being legal is 'good for society' is higher than the proportion of those with qualifications below A-Levels / high school graduates in both countries (UK – 52%, US – 24%), but the gap between the two is slightly wider in the US (22 points) than it is in the UK (15 points).

On economic questions, meanwhile, there is not a great deal of polarisation by education, except for the question of free trade. Degree holders in both countries are more likely (UK: 69%; US: 51%) than those with high school qualifications or lower (UK: 48%; US: 31%) to say their country has gained more than it has lost from free trade.

There is clearly a divide in both countries, therefore, by level of education, and a higher degree of educational qualifications are associated with more liberal values. It is on questions of immigration and race that this division is most evident, with a greater degree of division in the UK than there is in the US<sup>[13]</sup>. The previous report showed that supporters of parties on the right in the UK generally support a tougher approach than Trump supporters do in the US on these questions. Given the key role level of education plays in support for the right in the UK, this may partly explain why the degree of polarisation by level of education is greater in the UK than it is in the US.

## Sex

In the US, sex has been a dividing line in how people vote for nearly half a century. In every presidential election since 1980, there has been a 'gender gap' in voting, with more women than men favouring the Democratic candidate over the Republican one<sup>[14]</sup>. For example, at the 2024 election, 53% of women voted for Kamala Harris compared to 43% of men, while 55% of men backed Donald Trump versus 46% of women<sup>[15]</sup>. In the UK, a gender gap in voting behaviour is less prominent<sup>[16]</sup>, however there is evidence to support the emergence of a 'modern gender gap' in recent years, with a greater proportion of women backing left-leaning parties compared to men, and more support for right-wing parties among men, in the 2017, 2019 and 2024 general elections<sup>[17]</sup>. Given these differences in voting by sex, do we therefore see a division in attitudes on social issues, immigration and the economy, with men holding more conservative views and women more liberal

ones? And if so, is the degree of polarisation comparable in both the UK and US?

Firstly, looking at economic issues, we see evidence of polarisation in some areas, with men in both countries generally holding more right-wing views on the economy compared to women. On free trade, men in the US and UK are notably more positive. As shown in Table 4, three-quarters of men in the UK (75%) are in favour of making free trade agreements with other countries, compared to 56% of women. A similar division is seen in the US, with around half of men (46%) in favour versus a third of women (33%). It is worth noting the gap between men and women on this issue is slightly wider in the UK (19 points) than in the US (13 points). And when it comes to the size of government, men in both countries are more likely to favour a smaller state. In the UK, 72% of women would prefer having a bigger government providing more services, over a smaller one, compared to 62% of men – a gap of 10 points. Likewise, 53% of women in the US share this opinion versus 43% of men – also a gap of 10 points.


**Table 4 – Views on economic issues by sex, UK vs US**

	UK men	UK women	US men	US women
In favour of making free trade agreements with other countries	75%	56%	46%	33%
Prefer having a smaller government	72%	62%	43%	53%
Thinks government is almost always inefficient	60%	69%	60%	52%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1014</i>	<i>1067</i>	<i>799 / 1908</i>	<i>939 / 2412</i>
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>1010</i>	<i>1071</i>	<i>833 / 2081</i>	<i>901 / 2210</i>

Next, looking at social issues, we can see differences in opinion between men and women on topics which relate to womanhood, with men in both countries holding more conservative views, as perhaps might be expected. This is most evident when it comes to attitudes towards obstacles faced by women in society. Men in both the UK and US, but especially the latter, are substantially less likely to think that there are still significant obstacles that make it harder

for women to get ahead than men. As shown in Figure 5, in the UK, 53% of men think that these obstacles are now largely gone versus 32% of women – a gap of 21 points. And in the US, 61% of men hold this opinion compared to 33% of women – a gap of 28 points.

**Figure 5 Percentage who think that obstacles that once made it harder for women than men to get ahead are now largely gone by sex, UK vs US**



Similarly, but to a lesser extent, as shown in Table 5, men in both the UK and US are more conservative on issues such as the importance of marriage and having children, whether abortion should be legal in all cases and the benefits of contraception such as birth control pills and condoms to society. While men are more conservative than women on these issues, on the topic of


contraception, as also seen on obstacles faced by women, the gap in views between men and women is more pronounced in the US.

**Table 5 - Views on social issues by sex, UK vs US**

	UK men	UK women	US men	US women
Thinks society is better off if people make marriage and having children a priority	30%	22%	41%	33%
Thinks abortion should be legal in all cases	36%	42%	21%	28%
Thinks contraception such as birth control pills is very good for society	75%	81%	53%	65%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1014	1067	1908 / 3771 / 1863	2412 / 4853 / 2441
<i>Weighted base</i>	1010	1071	2081 / 4127 / 2046	2210 / 4457 / 2247

Finally, on racial diversity and immigration, are men more conservative in their views than women, and how does this compare in the two countries? The data suggests a mixed picture. On whether diversity strengthens or weakens society and whether a declining White population is a good or bad thing, we do not see a noticeable difference in attitudes by sex in either country. However, on some other issues regarding immigration and race we do see differences by sex, particularly in the US. When it comes to handling immigrants living in the country without permission, men are less favourable, with 42% of US men thinking such immigrants should not be allowed to stay in the country legally compared to 34% of US women, as shown in Figure 6. In the UK, 47% of men think such immigrants should not be allowed to stay versus 43% of women. Similarly, men are less likely to believe that White people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have – 50% of US men think White people benefit ‘not at all’ or ‘not too much’ from these advantages versus 42% of US women. In the UK, 56% of men think White people benefit not at all or not too much compared to 51% of women.

**Figure 6 Attitudes towards illegal immigrants and advantages that White people benefit from by sex, UK vs US**



In sum, while maybe not as prominent as age and education, sex is a dividing line in attitudes in both countries on several issues. This is particularly evident on social matters relating to womanhood, such as obstacles faced by women and abortion, with men in both the UK and US holding more conservative views. Similarly, while less stark, men in both nations tend to be more conservative on some areas around race and immigration. Meanwhile, on the economy, men in both nations hold more classically liberal views, with a greater preference for free trade and a smaller state. It is worth noting that where differences by sex are seen, they are generally more pronounced in the US, compared to the UK, aligning with evidence pointing to a more deeply-rooted ‘gender gap’ in voting patterns among Americans versus Brits<sup>[18]</sup> .

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# Summary

Our original report comparing UK and US attitudes found political polarisation to be an issue facing both countries. Each country is divided between left and right, although in the UK this is felt most significantly in attitudes towards race and immigration, whereas in the US there is a greater level of division on questions concerning economics, gender and family. Through this analysis we were able to understand important differences between right-wing movements in both countries. A Reform UK or Conservative supporter may take a more conservative view than a Trump supporter on illegal immigration or the merits of diversity, but the latter are both more economically protectionist and more socially conservative than the former on matters such as abortion or same-sex marriage. This analysis revealed the attitudinal drivers of right-wing movements in both countries but did not cover who their supporters were with regards to their demographic background.

With regards to where they draw their support, right-wing movements in both countries do better among those with fewer educational qualifications and the religious. These appear as the key drivers of support in the UK, whereas in the US a broader set of factors—including ethnicity, age, gender, and financial situation—play an independent role.

Beyond voting behaviour, demographic divides shape social attitudes differently across the two nations. Age polarises views in both countries, but more frequently and sharply in the US—especially on questions of national identity and economic policy. Education is associated with more liberal attitudes in both countries, particularly on race and immigration, though the gap is wider in the UK. Gender divides are particularly apparent on social issues relating to womanhood, such as abortion and equal opportunities, with men generally holding more conservative views, and these gaps are larger in the US than in the UK. On economic issues, men in both countries tend to favour free trade and smaller government, while differences on immigration and racial diversity are less pronounced, though men in both countries show slightly more nativist tendencies.

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In sum, right-wing support and social attitudes in the US reflect a more complex interplay of demographic factors than is found in the UK. Polarisation exists in both countries between the young and old, those with degrees and those without, and between men and women. However, just as with political polarisation, the nature and degree of this polarisation very much depends on the topic at hand.



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# Appendix

**Table A1 - UK Full Regression Model (Outcome: Right-Wing ‘Conservative, Reform UK vote at the 2024 General Election; Reference: Labour / Liberal Democrat / Green vote)**

	Reference Category	Odds Ratio (95% C.I.)	P-Value
<b>Gender</b>			
Man	Woman	1.05 (0.785 – 1.41)	0.73
<b>Age</b>			
30-49	16-29	0.945 (0.468 – 1.91)	0.875
50-64	16-29	1.22 (0.613 – 2.41)	0.575
65+	16-29	1.86 (0.945 – 3.66)	0.0726
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Mixed, Asian or Black	White	0.455 (0.220 – 0.943)	0.0341
<b>Religion</b>			
Religious	No Religion	1.82 (1.35 – 2.46)	<0.01
<b>Education</b>			
Education: Below A Levels or No Quals	Degree Holder or Above	2.14 (1.53 – 3.01)	<0.01
Education: A Levels or equivalent	Degree Holder or Above	1.98 (1.29 – 3.02)	<0.01
<b>Urban / Rural</b>			
Urban area	Rural Area	1.21 (0.852 – 1.73)	0.283
<b>Financial Circumstances</b>			

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Meet your basic expenses with a little left over for extras	Living comfortably	0.801 (0.587 – 1.09)	0.16
Just meeting financial needs	Living comfortably	0.800 (0.476 – 1.34)	0.397
Financially struggling	Living comfortably	0.875 (0.261 – 2.93)	0.828

**Table A2 - US Full Regression Model (Outcome: Trump supporter; Reference: Harris supporter)**

	Reference Category	Odds Ratio (95% C.I.)	P-Value
<b>Gender</b>			
Man	Woman	1.40 (1.17 - 1.67)	<0.01
<b>Age</b>			
Age: 30-49	18-29	1.78 (1.17 - 2.71)	<0.01
Age: 50-64	18-29	1.69 (1.12 – 2.58)	0.0121
Age: 65+	18-29	1.40 (0.911 – 2.14)	0.125
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Ethnicity: Mixed, Asian or Black	White	0.250 (0.194 – 0.323)	<0.01
<b>Religion</b>			
Religious	No Religion	4.12 (3.34 – 5.08)	<0.01
<b>Education</b>			
Education: High School Graduate or Less	College Degree or Above	1.83 (1.43 – 2.33)	<0.01
Education: Some College	College Degree or Above	1.28 (1.05 - 1.55)	<0.01
<b>Urban / Rural</b>			
Urban area	Rural Area	1.98 (1.62 – 2.43)	<0.01
<b>Financial Circumstances</b>			
Meet your basic expenses with a little left over for extras	Living comfortably	1.13 (0.927 – 1.39)	0.222

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Just meet your basic expenses	Living comfortably	1.64 (1.26 – 2.12)	<0.01
Don't even have enough to meet basic expenses	Living comfortably	1.61 (1.07 – 2.42)	0.0223

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# References

1. Further details on the methodologies of the American and UK Surveys can be found in the original report: <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2025-06/bsa-42-%7C-britain%26%23039%3Bs-democracy-1661.pdf> [↑](#)
2. <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2025-06/bsa-42-%7C-britain%26%23039%3Bs-democracy-1661.pdf> [↑](#)
3. <https://natcen.ac.uk/publications/uk-and-us-attitudes-two-sides-same-coin> [↑](#)
4. The full model results can be found in the Appendix to this report. The UK model uses 2024 General Election vote as the dependent variable, whereas the US model uses a question on how respondents would vote if the 2024 election were held today. [↑](#)
5. Results are presented in this table where they are significant at the 1% level. [↑](#)
6. Analysis of the relationship between religious background and ethnicity with questions asked as part of both surveys, and how they compare between the two countries, can be found in the original report here: <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2025-11/uk-and-us-attitudes%3A-two-sides-of-the-same-coin%3F--1781.pdf> [↑](#) [↑](#)
7. <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-09/BSA 40 Age differences.pdf> [↑](#)
8. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/age-generational-cohorts-and-party-identification/> [↑](#)
9. <https://www.smf.co.uk/publications/degrees-of-separation/> [↑](#)
10. <https://fs.wp.odu.edu/jzingher/wp-content/uploads/sites/1417/2021/09/Diploma-Divide.pdf> [↑](#)
11. In the UK – the exact question wording referred to ‘Black and Asian people’, whereas in the US the wording only referred to Black people. [↑](#)
12. In the US – the question wording referred to ‘undocumented migrants’. [↑](#)
13. <https://natcen.ac.uk/publications/uk-and-us-attitudes-two-sides-same-coin> [↑](#)

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14. <https://cawp.rutgers.edu/gender-gap-voting-choices-presidential-elections> ↑
  15. [https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/voting-patterns-in-the-2024-election/?\\_gl=1\\*3syvhq\\*\\_up\\*MQ..\\*\\_gs\\*MQ..&gclid=EAIaIQobChMlyMCiOLbTkQMVaI9QBh3yVQQSEAAAYASAAEgJv6\\_D\\_BwE](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/voting-patterns-in-the-2024-election/?_gl=1*3syvhq*_up*MQ..*_gs*MQ..&gclid=EAIaIQobChMlyMCiOLbTkQMVaI9QBh3yVQQSEAAAYASAAEgJv6_D_BwE) ↑
  16. <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-09/BSA 40 Evolution of the gender gap.pdf> ↑
  17. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.13477> ↑
  18. <https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-09/BSA 40 Evolution of the gender gap.pdf> ↑

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