

The evolution of the gender gap?

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British Social Attitudes 40



The evolution of the gender gap?

Women have historically been more likely to support parties of the right than men, due to their greater religiosity and lower exposure to the social institutions of the left. In many wealthy nations, as gender roles shifted, this traditional gender gap declined and a ‘modern’ gender gap emerged (with women being more likely to support left-wing parties than men). This chapter explores what British Social Attitudes (BSA) data tells us about the emergence of a ‘modern’ gender gap in Britain and whether this links to long-term shifts in the attitudes and values of men and women – and of younger generations of men and women specifically.



A gender gap in party support?

BSA data suggests that a ‘modern’ gender gap has emerged over the past decade, somewhat earlier than is conventionally claimed.

- There has been a small ‘modern’ gender gap in reported party vote on each survey conducted in an election year since 2005, with women being more likely to support the Labour Party compared with men (there was a gender gap of 6 percentage points in 2020).
- A ‘modern’ gender gap is evident for political party identification in every survey since 2008, and on a handful of surveys prior to that. In 2022, the modern gender gap in party identification stands at 4 percentage points.

The role of generations

There is some evidence that the emergence of the modern gender gap in recent years is the product of underlying generational differences in gender gaps in party support.

- Prior to the 2000s, there is little evidence of any difference in the gender gap across generations.
- Since the 2000s, however, generations born in 1960-79 and 1980 and after have shown a consistent 'modern' gender gap, sometimes reaching 15 percentage points. Generations born prior to 1960 tend to show the 'traditional' gender gap in this period.

A shift in values and attitudes?


In most instances, the attitudes and values of men and women, and different generations of men and women over the past 40 years show a pattern of gender 'overlaps', rather than gender gaps.

- Women have traditionally been marginally more right-wing than men, although the two groups exhibit very similar social values. There is no evidence in either area of a widening gender gap.
- While women are historically less likely than men to support traditional gender roles, there is no evidence of a widening gap in the views of the two sexes, or among men and women of any generation.
- Women have traditionally been more likely to want to remain in the European Union, compared with men. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the youngest two generations (those born between 1960-1979 and the post-1980 generation). After 2019, gender gaps in attitudes to the EU within generations reduced, perhaps reflecting the fact that Brexit has fallen in salience in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and during the cost-of-living crisis.

Introduction

Historically, women have often been greater supporters of parties of the right than men, a pattern termed by Inglehart and Norris (2003) as the ‘traditional’ gender gap. Women’s greater religiosity, and the association of many establishment religions with right-wing parties, alongside women’s lower exposure to the social institutions of the left, such as trade unions, were factors identified as accounting for this traditional gender gap in party of vote. However, in many wealthy nations, as gender roles shifted, this traditional gender gap declined and a ‘modern’ gender gap emerged. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris identified a global trend where, as women in advanced economies moved into paid employment and higher education, their party support moved to the left (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Now, most Western European and Anglo-American countries have such a ‘modern’ gender gap (Shorrocks 2018).

There is vast literature that seeks to explain why modern gender gaps have arisen. Sociological explanations predominate. Inglehart and Norris’ developmental theory of the gender gap argues that “long-term structural and cultural trends, which have transformed women’s and men’s lives, have gradually produced a realignment in gender politics in postindustrial societies” (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 442). They argue that women’s values have changed as they have become less religious and more likely to be in paid employment, leading women to become more feminist and egalitarian.



According to the developmental theory, women's shift leftward might also be partially explained by women's greater economic vulnerability relative to men, resulting from gender pay gaps and the ongoing limitations in their earning capacity generated by gendered divisions in unpaid work. Likewise, women are more often employed in the public sector which might push them to the left of men. Beyond these economic explanations, the theory suggests that, as women entered higher education, paid work and professional employment in higher numbers, their values shifted from a traditional concept of women's role within the family to one where they looked to the state to be a more active participant, providing services that support families and enable women's employment. Thus, changing gender norms might lead women to shift to the left of men for reasons beyond economic vulnerability or employment sector. The focus, therefore, in this explanatory account is on social change leading to value and attitudinal shifts which impact vote choice. There is also a generational element, whereby it is particularly younger generations of women who have experienced higher labour force participation, higher education, and less traditional gender roles, and who thus should become more economically left-leaning, more socially liberal, and more supportive of gender equality, pushing them to the left of men in their vote choice.

This chapter builds on research that has identified a 'modern' gender¹ gap in party of vote that has recently emerged in Britain (Campbell and Shorrocks, 2021). Whilst it is clear that the modern gender gap arrived in Britain surprisingly late, very few studies have examined how gender differences in values and attitudes have actually changed over time, and whether such long-term shifts can plausibly account for the emergence of the modern gender gap. The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey series captures a unique picture of attitudinal and value change over time, which we exploit in this chapter to explore the extent to which the emergence of the modern gender gap in Britain can be linked to changing underlying values and attitudes amongst men and women. Using BSA data allows us to explore the explanatory power of the 'developmental' theory of the gender gap, as this theory emphasises both long-term and generational change.

1 In this literature 'gender' is used to refer to differences in survey research that were usually measured using a binary measure of 'respondent's biological sex'. More recent surveys often also include non-binary and other categories. The gender gaps we refer to throughout this chapter are between respondents who declared themselves to be male or female in the sex or gender question in the survey they participated in.

In this chapter, we explore shifts over time and within and between generations in gender differences in party support. We then consider shifts in economic and social values, our hypothesis being that younger generations of women have become more economically left-wing and socially liberal than men of their generation or men and women of older generations, leading to the emergence of a modern gender gap. We next examine changes in gender gaps in spending preferences and attitudes to the European Union (EU). We focus on these areas because spending preferences and issue prioritisation might also be associated with the long-term changes detailed by the developmental theory, and because the EU has been highly salient in recent British elections. Finally, we conclude the chapter by drawing together this evidence to ascertain how far the emergence of a modern gender gap in Britain reflects the developmental theory of the gender gap, or how far this development needs to be understood within the specific context within which British politics currently operates.


Gender gaps in party support

How can the concepts of a ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ gender gap be applied to Britain? Drawing on the British Election Study (BES), Figure 1 presents data on the gender gap in Britain between 1964 and 2019, with the blue bars (equating to negative numbers) indicating that women are more likely to support the Conservative Party than men, and the red bars (equating to positive numbers) indicating that women are more likely to support the Labour Party than men.



In the period following World War 2, a greater proportion of women than men have typically voted for the Conservative Party at general elections (suggesting a traditional gender gap), although this difference became negligible from the 1970s. However, a ‘modern’ gender gap does not appear to occur until 2017, when a greater proportion of women voted for the Labour Party than men, and a greater proportion of men voted for the Conservative Party than women. Thus, it appears that Britain has been a late joiner to the global phenomenon of a modern gender gap, with this first appearing nearly four decades after it emerged in Scandinavia and the United States.

Figure 1 The British two-party gender gap, 1945–2019




Source: Gallup Polls, 1945–59; British Election Study (BES), 1964–2019. Adapted from P. Norris, 'Gender: a gender generation gap?' (Norris 1999)

The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared with men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared with women

What does data from the BSA surveys suggest in terms of the emergence of a modern gender gap? Using a measure which captures who people reported they voted for in the last general election from 2001 onwards, in Figure 2, we calculate the gender gap in the same way as was done in Figure 1 – with positive numbers (and red bars) indicating that women are more supportive of the Labour Party and less supportive of the Conservatives than men (and negative numbers and blue bars denoting the opposite). Figure 2 suggests that a modern gender gap is evident in the BSA data from 2005, although the gap does not reach the 12 percentage points suggested by the BES in 2017 or 2019.

Figure 2 Gender gap in party vote, 2001-2020



+ The data collected in 2020 relates to the 2019 General Election


The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to women

The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix to this chapter

The BSA surveys also contain an item measuring people's identification with a political party (termed 'partisan identification'), which is available for a much longer time period – from the year the survey began (1983) to the latest year of data collection (2022). Partisan identification differs from party of vote in that it is a measure of psychological attachment to a political party. We ask respondents if they think of themselves as “a supporter of any one political party”, with those responding in the negative being asked if they think of themselves as “a little closer to one political party than to the others”, and those still answering in the negative being additionally asked, “if there was a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would most be likely to support?”. This series of questions therefore captures an underlying measure of party support rather than recording who people recall voting for in a specific election. Usually, partisan identification correlates strongly, but not perfectly, with reported voting behaviour. For example, some voters will cast a tactical vote for a less preferred party in the belief that they are more likely to win the election. Figure 3 depicts the gender gap using BSA data on party identification, calculated in the same way as was the case for Figures 1 and 2.

It demonstrates a somewhat different pattern to Figure 1 (based on BES party of vote data). A traditional gender gap is apparent between 1983 and 1999 and is also evident in the 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007 data. However, from 2008, a modern gender gap is evident in every survey. Thus, the modern gender gap is observable for around a decade longer from BSA data than was the case with the BES data, although its magnitude is somewhat smaller.

Figure 3 Gender gap in partisan identification, 2001-2020




The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to women

The data on which Figure 3 is based can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix to this chapter

The BSA time series data will therefore allow us to explore the emergence of a ‘modern’ gender gap in British politics. Before doing so, it is worth noting that, in this chapter, we focus on the gender gap for the two largest political parties because that is where the largest gender differences are evident. However, Britain has a multi-party and regionally-specific party system. Figure 4 depicts the extent to which women are more likely to identify than men with the smaller political parties in Britain (with a positive percentage indicating that women are more likely to identify with a party than men, and a negative percentage indicating the opposite)². Clearly, there are a few consistent gender gaps in support for the smaller political parties. Throughout its existence, men were slightly more likely to identify with UKIP than were women, while the Green Party received more support from women in the majority of surveys, with this gap in support increasing in recent years. It is also noteworthy that women are more likely to not identify with any political party, compared with men.

Figure 4 Political party identification (women over men) for smaller political parties, 1983-2022



Partisan identification (women over men) is calculated by identifying the proportion of women who identify with a particular political party, then deducting the proportion of men who do so. Positive percentages therefore indicate that women are more likely to identify with a political party compared with men, with negative numbers denoting the opposite

The data on which Figure 4 is based can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix to this chapter

2 There is limited sample size in the BSA Scottish sub-sample prior to 2020, and we therefore exclude the Scottish National Party (SNP) from this analysis.


The emergence of a modern gender gap: the role of generations

As noted previously, there is a generational element to the developmental theory of the modern gender gap, with it being argued that younger generations of women, who have experienced higher labour force participation, higher education, and less traditional gender roles, would be expected to become more economically left-leaning, socially liberal, and supportive of gender equality, pushing them to the left of men in their vote choices. To test this theory, we have disaggregated the BSA party identification data by generation. Respondents have been divided into four generations: people born before 1946; people born between 1946 and 1959; people born between 1960 and 1979; and people born from 1980 onwards. As well as roughly corresponding to the oft-cited 'pre-war', 'baby boomer', 'generation X', and 'millennial' generations (Stoker, 2014) (although these generations themselves often do not have clear cut-offs), this categorisation provides us with groups of similar sizes, apart from the 'millennial' generation, which is considerably smaller.



In Figure 5, we depict the Conservative-Labour gender gap in party support within each of these four generations. Gaps below zero indicate the 'traditional' gender gap, where women are more supportive of the Conservatives vs. Labour than men, and gaps above zero indicate the 'modern' gender gap, where women are more supportive of Labour vs. the Conservatives than men. This provides some evidence that the emergence of the modern gender gap in recent years is the product of underlying generational differences in gender gaps in party support. Whilst there is some year-by-year fluctuation, in general the gaps for the two youngest generations tend to be above zero, indicating higher support for Labour amongst women in these groups, and the gaps for these generations reach up to around 15 percentage points. In contrast, the gaps for the two oldest generations are more often below zero, indicating higher support for the Conservatives amongst women of these generations. The generational divide in the gender gap is particularly evident from the mid-2000s onwards; prior to this, there are fewer generational differences in the gender gap.

Figure 5 Gender gap+ in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022



+ A gender gap above 0 indicates higher support for the Labour Party among women than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates higher support for the Conservative Party for women of a particular generation

The data on which Figure 5 is based can be found in Table A.4 in the appendix to this chapter

In the remainder of this chapter, we consider how far the emergence of a modern gender gap in Britain can be explained by evolving gaps in values between men and women.

Gender gaps in values

Economic values

To understand how values might underpin gender gaps in party support, we begin by examining the classic measure of economic left-right values, measuring the extent to which an individual holds a socialist vs. a laissez-faire position. In Britain, socialist values have a long history of association with support for the Labour Party and, likewise, laissez-faire economic values are traditionally linked to the Conservative Party (the chapter on age differences (Curtice, Ratti, Montagu and Deeming, 2023) explores how the association between left-right values and party preferences has evolved over time). In addition, the developmental theory of the gender gap suggests that changes in women's lived experiences may have pushed them to the economic left of men, which is theorised to account for the emergence of the modern gender gap in party support in advanced economies.

Since 1986, the BSA survey has included a 'left-right' scale comprising five items which the respondent can agree or disagree with:

Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well-off

Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers

Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth


There is one law for the rich and one for the poor



Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance

Further details are available in the Technical Details. In Figure 6, we depict how positions on the left-right scale have evolved for men and women over time, with an average score below 50% indicating the balance of opinion within a group is more ‘left-wing’ at a particular point in time (and a score above 50% indicating that it is more ‘right-wing’).

Figure 6 Left-right values, by sex, 1986-2022




Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

The data on which Figure 6 is based can be found in Table A.5 in the appendix to this chapter

Surprisingly, we see very little difference between men and women’s average scores on this scale, with women being situated marginally to the right of men throughout most of the period, including in the most recent years. Figure 6 may, however, conceal differences in gaps between the views of men and women in different generations.

In Figure 7 we show the gender gaps in left-right values for each of our four generations (full data for men and women of each generation is available in the chapter appendix). The fuller data reveals that, across the board, for most of the period, older generations have been somewhat more economically left-wing than younger generations, with younger generations only becoming more left-wing than older generations from around 2016 onwards. When looking at the gender gap within generations, we see that for all generations, women are generally more to the right than men (denoted by positive gender gaps in Figure 7). Surprisingly, at some points women of the youngest two generations are the most right-wing of all the gender-by-generational groups, in contrast to what we would expect, and the Conservatives have always done least well with these groups of women (see Appendix Table A.4). However, within all generations the gender gaps on this measure are comparatively small, often only around 2-3 percentage points on the 100-point scale.

Figure 7 Gender gaps+ in left-right values, by generation, 1986-2022



+ A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more right-wing than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more left-wing than men in a particular generation

The data on which Figure 7 is based can be found in Table A.6 in the appendix to this chapter

In neither the analysis of gender gaps in left-right values for men and women over time, or within individual generations over time, do we see evidence of a realignment of the gender gap in economic values.

Social values

If a growing gender gap in economic values does not account for the gender gap in party support, perhaps the growth of socially liberal values is a more useful predictor. Historically economic, rather than social values, have generally been considered more central to British electoral politics. However, this changed in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, and the subsequent realignment of party support that took place in the 2019 General Election when the Conservative Party took dozens of traditional Labour constituencies in the so called ‘red wall’ of post-industrial communities in the midlands and North of England (Prosser 2021). In recent years, the role of shifting social values has been given more weight in explanations of party support (Fieldhouse et al. 2020; Jennings and Stoker 2017; Sobolewska and Ford 2020). Younger generations and those living in urban areas and university towns have become increasingly socially liberal, and also more likely to support the Labour Party, compared with older generations and those living in more economically-disadvantaged areas. People with university degrees have always tended to be more socially liberal than those without, but there is now a far greater proportion of graduates in younger generations than among older cohorts. Thus, there is an increased polarisation in social values in Britain which has become an important electoral cleavage underpinning support for the Labour and Conservative parties (as detailed in the chapter on age differences). If this trend towards social liberalism has moved more quickly amongst women than men, then we might expect a gender gap in party support to emerge, as social liberals are now much more likely to vote for the Labour Party than the Conservatives.


The BSA surveys measure social liberalism in several ways. The most widely-cited measure of social liberalism in the academic literature is the six-item ‘liberal-authoritarian’ scale; which includes responses to questions about whether young people have enough respect for traditional values, attitudes toward the death penalty, whether the law should always be obeyed, the length of custodial sentences and whether government should be able to ban undemocratic organisations (further details are available in the Technical Details). In this chapter, we exclude an item measuring attitudes to censorship – “censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards by sex” – from our analysis.

Previous research has shown that women are considerably more supportive of this statement than men (see Fowler, 2022), as confirmed by our own analysis which shows an average gender gap of 13 percentage points on this item since 1986. A gender difference on this item may not reflect a more traditionally authoritarian position on the part of women – but may instead indicate gender differences in attitudes to pornography, where women are more often portrayed as sexual objects than men³.

Using the reduced libertarian-authoritarian scale, we considered whether there have been long-term shifts in these values which might help us understand the recent emergence of the modern gender gap. Figure 8 presents the average scores on the libertarian-authoritarian scale recorded by men and women since the scale was first introduced in 1986, with a score of more than 50% denoting a more authoritarian position (and a score of less than 50% denoting a more liberal position). While men and women have become more liberal in their attitudes over time (as detailed in the Introduction to this report), Figure 8 indicates that there has been little difference in the average scores of men and women on this scale, at any time in the last 40 years.

³ Reinforcing this view, an analysis of data collected as part of the 2017 survey found that men are much more likely than women to view adult content in films as acceptable, with 58% of men compared with 32% of women saying that “adults should be able to watch whatever films they like” (Clery, Curtice and Harding 2017: 102).

Figure 8 Libertarian-authoritarian values, by sex, 1986-2022




Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

The data on which Figure 8 is based can be found in Table A.7 in the appendix to this chapter

Once again, we also consider whether there are gender gaps in libertarian-authoritarian values in different generations and how these gaps may have evolved over time. These data are presented in Figure 9 (with full data showing average libertarian-authoritarian scores for men and women of each generation available in the chapter appendix). Whilst we see in the full data that older generations are consistently more authoritarian than younger generations, Figure 9 shows that once again, the pattern in terms of gender gaps is not what we would expect. For older generations, it is women who are slightly less authoritarian than men, indicated by gender gaps with negative values. Conversely, in the youngest generation, born in 1980 and after, women are more authoritarian than men, as indicated by the positive gender gaps for this generation depicted in Figure 9, although again the gender gaps within any generation are comparatively small. Therefore, there is little evidence that changes in libertarian-authoritarian values among men and women can help us to understand the emergence of the modern gender gap in Britain.

Figure 9 Gender gaps+ in libertarian-authoritarian values, by generation, 1986-2022



+ A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more authoritarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more libertarian than men in a particular generation

The data on which Figure 9 is based can be found in Table A.8 in the appendix to this chapter


However, the libertarian-authoritarian scale is just one measure of social liberalism included on the BSA surveys. The values theorised to provide potential explanations for a modern gender gap by Inglehart and Norris (2003) were more associated with attitudes towards the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, such as civil rights, gay rights, and women’s rights, than attitudes toward authority. Inglehart’s work on postmaterial values has had a profound impact on the study of politics. He has argued that, in the post-World War Two period, younger generations in postindustrial nations increasingly had their material needs met and thus shifted their attention to other kinds of inequality. This separation is rather artificial, given that economic divisions underpinned gender and racial inequality, but the concept of postmaterialism helps us to expand our understanding of social liberalism beyond the libertarian-authoritarian axis.

To capture this aspect of social liberalism, we consider attitudes to gender equality by comparing men and women’s responses to a question about traditional gender roles. Since 1984, respondents have regularly been asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that:

A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.

Full data and detailed discussion of this item is available in the chapter on gender roles (Allen and Stevenson, 2023). In Figure 10, we depict how the responses of men and women to this item have evolved over time. It reveals evidence of a small but consistent gender gap where women are more likely to disagree with the statement. The general trend for men and women is the same with an increasing disagreement evident for both groups with the notion that it is a man’s role to earn money, whilst the woman focuses on the home and family⁴.

Figure 10 Disagreement that “a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”, by sex, 1984-2022




The data on which Figure 10 is based can be found in Table A.9 in the appendix to this chapter

4 There are small differences between Labour and Conservative identifiers on this item. Pooling across the BSA time-series, 61% of Labour party identifiers strongly disagree or disagree that a man’s job is to earn money and women should look after the home and family, compared to 53% of Conservative identifiers.

In Figure 11, we present gender gaps on this item for our four different generations between 1984 and 2022 (full data for the responses of men and women of each generation to this item are presented in the chapter appendix). Figure 11 shows that, whilst women tend to be more gender-egalitarian than men (gender gaps above zero), there is little systematic difference in the gender gaps between generations.

Figure 11 Gender gaps+ in attitudes to gender roles, by generation, 1984-2022



+ A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more gender-egalitarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more gender-traditional than men in a particular generation

The data on which Figure 11 is based can be found in Table A.10 in the appendix to this chapter

Attitudes to public spending

Overall, our analysis of gender gaps in values over time tends to show more ‘gender overlaps’ than ‘gender gaps’, with little suggestion that gender gaps in values have widened over time or for the youngest generation, despite the emergence of the ‘modern’ gender gap. We now move on to look at different sets of attitudes to see if gender gaps on these measures have changed over time, despite the lack of change in gender gaps seen on the value measures. We first examine attitudes toward public spending. The developmental thesis suggests that women should be more supportive of public spending than men, because of their weaker economic position, the gendered division of labour, and their higher levels of employment in the public sector. Indeed, women have frequently been found to be slightly more supportive of higher taxes and public spending than men (Campbell 2012). In Figure 12, we assess whether this has been the case over the past 40 years using data from the BSA surveys obtained in response to an item which asks respondents the following question:



Suppose the government had to choose between the following three options. Which do you think it should choose?


Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits

Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now

Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits

Figure 12 indicates that there has historically been a small gender gap in response to this item, with women being slightly more supportive of higher taxes and spending than men across most surveys.


Figure 12 Proportion wanting the government to increase taxes and spend more, by sex, 1983-2022



The data on which Figure 12 is based can be found in Table A.11 in the appendix to this chapter

When we consider how the gender gaps in different generations have evolved over time, as depicted in Figure 13, we see a very similar pattern. Women of all generations tend to be slightly more likely to favour greater taxation and spending than do men, indicated by the positive gender gaps in Figure 13. However, as shown in the detailed data on the views of men and women of different generations, available in Table A.12 in the appendix to this chapter, women of the youngest generation are still one of the groups least in favour of increased taxation and spending, because younger generations across the board are less in favour of this idea. Thus, we see no evidence of an emerging gender gap in attitudes towards public spending (either at the population level, or for individual generations), meaning this is also unlikely to be underpinning the shift to the modern gender gap.

Figure 13 Gender gaps+ in attitudes to public spending, by generation, 1983-2022




+ A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more likely to favour spending and taxation than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less likely to favour taxation and spending than men in a particular generation

The data on which Figure 13 is based can be found in Table A.12 in the appendix to this chapter

Attitudes towards the EU

One of the most salient issues in recent years for political party choice has been attitudes to the EU, and support for Leave/Remain has been associated with underlying value differences in the electorate, with authoritarians more supportive of Brexit (Fowler, 2022). Women were no less likely to vote for Brexit than men, but men are disproportionately represented among ‘hard’ Brexit supporters, and younger women are more likely to be Remain supporters than younger men (Campbell and Shorrocks 2021; Fowler, 2022). Respondents to the 2021 BSA survey were asked the following question to assess their attitudes to the EU:



Leaving aside the result of the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, what do you think Britain’s policy should be? Should it be to...

Be outside the European Union

Be part of the EU but try to reduce the EU’s powers

Be part of the EU and try to keep the EU’s powers as they are


Be part of the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers

Work for the formation of a single European government

Prior to the Brexit Referendum in 2016, the wording of this question was slightly different, based on the fact that Britain was a member of the EU at that point in time.

Figure 14 presents gender gaps in attitudes to the EU since this item was first asked in 1983, allowing us to explore whether differences between men and women in their attitudes to the EU have changed over time. It shows that, historically, women were more likely than men to prefer to stay in the EU with no change to its powers, with the exception of the 2020 survey.


Figure 14 Proportion wanting to stay in the European Union with no change in its powers, by sex, 1983-2022



The data on which Figure 14 is based can be found in Table A.13 in the appendix to this chapter

When we break the data down further by generation, presented in Figure 15, we find that the gender gap in the proportion wanting to stay in the EU with no change in its powers (with women more often preferring this position) is generally larger and more consistent for the 1960-79 and post-1980 generations than for the oldest generations. There is a gender gap for older generations on preferences to stay in the EU, but this gap tends to reduce from the mid-2000s. Therefore, most of the aggregate gender gap in attitudes towards the EU in the recent BSA data has been driven by gender gaps in younger generations. Since 2019, there has been more convergence between the sexes across generations (with gender gaps reducing), perhaps reflecting the fact that Brexit has fallen in salience in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and due to the ongoing cost-of-living crisis.

Figure 15 Gender gaps+ in attitudes to the European Union, by generation, 1983-2022



+ A gender gap above 0 indicates that women more in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation

The data on which Figure 15 is based can be found in Table A.14 in the appendix to this chapter

Explaining the gender gap

In this chapter, we have explored the extent to which the modern gender gap that has emerged in party vote choice (for which we use party identification as a proxy) can be explained by long-term value shifts – both over time and within generations – in values and attitudes between men and women. Overall, we find little change in these ‘underlying’ gender gaps over time, and where gender gaps do appear, they are fairly evenly spread across generations. One exception is in attitudes towards the EU where a gender gap opened up among younger generations, but converged again after 2019 when the issue of EU membership declined in political salience.



In this final section, we move beyond an examination of individual items to assess the extent to which these differences in attitudes account for the modern gender gap in political party support. To do this, we ran a series of multivariate models (logistic regression); further details regarding our methodology and detailed results are presented in the appendix to this chapter. Our first model, which includes data on sex, party preference and survey year, simply confirms that women have become more supportive of the Labour Party over time. To our next three models, we added left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values, then spending preferences, then attitudes towards the EU, in turn – to ascertain the extent to which these attitudes and values explain the emerging gender gap in party preferences⁵.

⁵ Although we would have also liked to have included attitudes to gender roles in one of these models, there is insufficient overlap across the time series; in addition, our analysis suggests that the measure available captures very little variation in gender differences by time or generation.

Unsurprisingly, given the small differences identified in the descriptive analyses reported above, we find that adding each of these sets of measures makes only a marginal difference to the relationship between sex and year, confirming that these values and attitudes are not strongly associated with change in the gender gap over time (and so cannot be attributed with driving the emergence of a 'modern gender gap').

Conclusion

In this chapter, we set out to establish whether the modern gender gap in party of vote that emerged in the 2017 and 2019 general elections (and appears across the last decade, according to BSA data on voting behaviour and party preference) can be accounted for by gender and gender-by-generational shifts in political values and attitudes. We find little evidence that a gap has opened up between men and women, or even just younger men and women's, political values and spending priorities. We see some long-term established differences, with marginally more women than men supporting higher taxation than spending, and women being more hostile to traditional gender roles; otherwise, gender 'overlaps' are more common than gender 'gaps'. We thus conclude that long-term change in gender gaps in values and attitudes is not behind the emergence of the 'modern' gender gap in Britain.



One area where a 'gender by generation' divide was apparent is in attitudes towards the EU, where younger women were more pro-Remain than younger men, although this gap narrowed after 2019 when the issue declined in salience. We suggest this provides evidence that the gender gap in party support in recent elections is the result of the interaction between electoral context, including party policy, and pre-existing gender gaps in attitudes and values. As the issue of the EU became salient, the underlying gender gap in attitudes towards the EU became more influential for the gender gap in party support, an argument consistent with other work which links attitudes towards the EU to the gender gap in the 2019 election (Campbell and Shorrocks, 2021).

Others have also found that earlier gender gaps in 2015 and 2017 were linked to gender disparities in economic and financial concerns, suggesting the underlying gender gaps in spending preferences were more salient in these post-austerity elections (Sanders and Shorrocks, 2019).

Thus, we argue that whether a modern gender gap will be evident at the next general election will therefore depend on how the parties compete over issues where men and women differ in their values and attitudes, rather than because of changing value and attitudinal gender gaps themselves. Since the EU is likely to be less salient, we might expect the gender gap to reduce at the next election. However, we also know that women are more concerned about and prioritise healthcare more than men (Campbell, 2014; Campbell and Shorrocks, 2021), whilst men tend to prioritise immigration (Campbell, 2006). If the NHS and immigration remain salient during the next election, as seems likely, we expect this to further strengthen the modern gender gap.

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Appendix

Table A.1 Gender gap in Conservative and Labour vote, 2001-2020

	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017	2020*
Men						
Labour	48%	42%	30%	33%	42%	34%
Conservative	26%	31%	38%	40%	41%	44%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>915</i>	<i>1272</i>	<i>321</i>	<i>1320</i>	<i>1002</i>	<i>1444</i>
Women						
Labour	49%	44%	34%	34%	46%	37%
Conservative	28%	31%	38%	39%	38%	42%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1204</i>	<i>1561</i>	<i>412</i>	<i>1620</i>	<i>1127</i>	<i>1681</i>
Gender gap**	-1%	2%	4%	1%	8%	6%

* The data collected in 2020 relates to the 2019 General Election

** The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to women



Table A.2 Gender gap in partisan identification, 1983-2022

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994
Men										
Labour	35%	37%	38%	37%	31%	36%	43%	36%	39%	41%
Conservative	39%	38%	31%	34%	39%	39%	34%	35%	32%	31%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	807	780	822	1445	1326	1396	1256	1292	1220	1507
Women										
Labour	31%	33%	35%	33%	28%	31%	35%	35%	37%	40%
Conservative	38%	39%	31%	33%	37%	40%	36%	34%	33%	27%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	954	895	982	1655	1521	1633	1541	1626	1706	1962
Gender gap*	-2%	-5%	-3%	-2%	-1%	-5%	-11%	-1%	-3%	3%
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Men										
Labour	47%	45%	43%	44%	43%	41%	45%	41%	40%	31%
Conservative	27%	28%	30%	26%	27%	30%	24%	25%	26%	28%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1559	1576	555	1336	1395	1458	1422	1522	1959	1391
Women										
Labour	42%	39%	41%	45%	42%	40%	44%	41%	35%	32%
Conservative	26%	28%	26%	26%	23%	26%	23%	25%	24%	25%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2074	2044	800	1810	1748	1968	1865	1913	2473	1808
Gender gap*	-4%	-6%	3%	1%	3%	2%	0%	0%	-2%	4%

* The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to women

Table A.2 Gender gap in partisan identification, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Men										
Labour	40%	35%	35%	27%	25%	28%	33%	35%	33%	30%
Conservative	25%	26%	24%	33%	30%	30%	28%	27%	27%	27%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1901	1915	1818	1923	1486	1442	1448	1443	1450	1255
Women										
Labour	40%	31%	33%	28%	27%	31%	31%	33%	33%	29%
Conservative	24%	25%	25%	31%	26%	28%	25%	24%	22%	24%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2367	2375	2306	2560	1933	1852	1861	1804	1792	1623
Gender gap*	1%	-4%	-3%	3%	6%	5%	1%	2%	4%	1%
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
Men										
Labour	31%	28%	38%	34%	28%	32%	32%	37%		
Conservative	33%	34%	31%	28%	29%	34%	33%	28%		
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1903	1291	1806	1690	1453	1754	2687	2882		
Women										
Labour	29%	31%	39%	37%	26%	36%	32%	38%		
Conservative	30%	32%	28%	27%	26%	32%	29%	25%		
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2423	1650	2182	2187	1769	2119	3373	3669		
Gender gap*	1%	5%	5%	4%	1%	6%	4%	4%		

* The gender gap is calculated as the difference in the Conservative-Labour lead for women and men; positive numbers indicate women are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to men, and negative numbers indicate men are more supportive of Labour than the Conservatives compared to women

Table A.3 Political party identification (women over men) for smaller political parties, 1983-2022

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994
Liberal Democrat lead women	3%	2%	1%	2%	3%	1%	0%	0%	-1%	1%
Green lead women						0%	2%	0%	1%	0%
No id lead women	-1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	0%	2%	3%	1%	1%
UKIP lead women										
<i>Male unweighted base</i>	807	780	822	1445	1326	1396	1256	1292	1220	1507
<i>Female unweighted base</i>	954	895	982	1655	1521	1633	1541	1626	1706	1962
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Liberal Democrat lead women	4%	2%	0%	1%	2%	2%	1%	-1%	3%	1%
Green lead women	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%
No id lead women	1%	3%	2%	0%	0%	1%	1%	-2%	2%	0%
UKIP lead women										-1%
<i>Male unweighted base</i>	1559	1576	555	1336	1395	1458	1422	1522	1959	1391
<i>Female unweighted base</i>	2074	2044	800	1810	1748	1968	1865	1913	2473	1808
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Liberal Democrat lead women	1%	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Green lead women	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
No id lead women	1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	1%	4%	3%	4%	2%
UKIP lead women	0%	0%	0%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-2%	-3%
<i>Male unweighted base</i>	1901	1915	1818	1923	1486	1442	1448	1443	1450	1255
<i>Female unweighted base</i>	2367	2375	2306	2560	1933	1852	1861	1804	1792	1623

Partisan identification (women over men) is calculated by identifying the proportion of women who identify with a particular political party, then deducting the proportion of men who do so. Positive percentages therefore indicate that women are more likely to identify with a political party compared with men, with negative numbers denoting the opposite

Table A.3 Political party identification (women over men) for smaller political parties, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
Liberal Democrat lead women	0%	-1%	-2%	-1%	2%	-1%	-1%	0%		
Green lead women	1%	0%	1%	0%	2%	3%	4%	2%		
No id lead women	4%	2%	4%	-1%	2%	1%	4%	3%		
UKIP lead women	-1%	-2%	-2%	-2%	-1%	-1%	0%	0%		
<i>Male unweighted base</i>	<i>1903</i>	<i>1291</i>	<i>1806</i>	<i>1690</i>	<i>1453</i>	<i>1754</i>	<i>2687</i>	<i>2882</i>		
<i>Female unweighted base</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1650</i>	<i>2182</i>	<i>2187</i>	<i>1769</i>	<i>2119</i>	<i>3373</i>	<i>3669</i>		

Partisan identification (women over men) is calculated by identifying the proportion of women who identify with a particular political party, then deducting the proportion of men who do so. Positive percentages therefore indicate that women are more likely to identify with a political party compared with men, with negative numbers denoting the opposite

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022

Men	Party vote	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991
born before 1946	Labour	37%	39%	41%	36%	29%	40%	44%	36%
	Conservative	42%	40%	34%	40%	46%	43%	40%	41%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	490	465	436	789	704	719	638	647
born 1946-59	Labour	39%	37%	36%	40%	34%	36%	47%	37%
	Conservative	47%	40%	34%	37%	40%	41%	36%	40%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	229	199	233	390	368	352	321	337
born 1960-79	Labour	42%	45%	48%	48%	42%	40%	52%	44%
	Conservative	37%	39%	30%	25%	35%	43%	30%	30%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	88	113	151	266	254	323	295	304
born 1980 and after	Labour								
	Conservative								
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>								
Men	Party vote	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
born before 1946	Labour	44%	42%	49%	44%	42%	47%	43%	42%
	Conservative	34%	38%	33%	36%	39%	34%	39%	40%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	511	631	659	625	216	517	547	544
born 1946-59	Labour	39%	47%	55%	54%	45%	54%	51%	46%
	Conservative	38%	31%	27%	26%	30%	25%	32%	33%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	375	413	401	408	142	331	326	332
born 1960-79	Labour	43%	45%	52%	52%	52%	51%	54%	52%
	Conservative	33%	29%	27%	29%	30%	28%	23%	29%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	330	460	493	537	197	473	489	530
born 1980 and after	Labour								
	Conservative								
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>								

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

Men	Party vote	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
born before 1946	Labour	52%	45%	44%	40%	44%	40%	41%	33%
	Conservative	27%	35%	38%	37%	39%	38%	35%	46%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>501</i>	<i>492</i>	<i>646</i>	<i>413</i>	<i>610</i>	<i>553</i>	<i>538</i>	<i>547</i>
born 1946-59	Labour	47%	44%	50%	38%	41%	43%	44%	33%
	Conservative	29%	34%	28%	32%	31%	33%	28%	37%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>332</i>	<i>348</i>	<i>512</i>	<i>373</i>	<i>498</i>	<i>445</i>	<i>413</i>	<i>448</i>
born 1960-79	Labour	53%	52%	48%	39%	48%	43%	43%	31%
	Conservative	25%	23%	27%	33%	23%	27%	30%	39%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>533</i>	<i>586</i>	<i>689</i>	<i>496</i>	<i>631</i>	<i>724</i>	<i>678</i>	<i>699</i>
born 1980 and after	Labour			40%	23%	53%	38%	39%	31%
	Conservative			25%	26%	16%	22%	20%	34%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>			<i>112</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>191</i>	<i>189</i>	<i>227</i>
Men	Party vote	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
born before 1946	Labour	33%	34%	37%	40%	34%	30%	29%	24%
	Conservative	41%	43%	46%	43%	44%	42%	52%	55%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>358</i>	<i>383</i>	<i>331</i>	<i>355</i>	<i>319</i>	<i>280</i>	<i>382</i>	<i>248</i>
born 1946-59	Labour	36%	39%	41%	37%	38%	34%	34%	26%
	Conservative	33%	33%	36%	35%	36%	37%	42%	42%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>381</i>	<i>341</i>	<i>366</i>	<i>383</i>	<i>359</i>	<i>302</i>	<i>450</i>	<i>322</i>
born 1960-79	Labour	30%	33%	39%	44%	40%	39%	37%	33%
	Conservative	38%	37%	33%	31%	30%	30%	35%	38%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>552</i>	<i>522</i>	<i>521</i>	<i>505</i>	<i>513</i>	<i>449</i>	<i>642</i>	<i>436</i>
born 1980 and after	Labour	23%	32%	48%	49%	45%	39%	37%	39%
	Conservative	34%	31%	23%	29%	24%	24%	30%	33%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>228</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>257</i>	<i>222</i>	<i>428</i>	<i>284</i>

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

Men	Party vote	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
born before 1946	Labour	26%	28%	24%					
	Conservative	56%	56%	47%					
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	307	264	213					
born 1946-59	Labour	40%	35%	27%	32%	25%	32%		
	Conservative	38%	41%	43%	49%	52%	47%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	456	431	371	530	768	759		
born 1960-79	Labour	43%	41%	32%	34%	33%	42%		
	Conservative	37%	34%	34%	43%	42%	34%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	607	574	486	576	896	973		
born 1980 and after	Labour	53%	50%	41%	47%	49%	52%		
	Conservative	25%	19%	25%	24%	21%	19%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	424	406	372	481	799	919		
Women	Party vote	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991
born before 1946	Labour	33%	36%	37%	33%	26%	31%	38%	34%
	Conservative	45%	42%	37%	40%	43%	45%	44%	42%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	610	536	543	935	844	842	737	826
born 1946-59	Labour	34%	32%	40%	37%	34%	32%	36%	40%
	Conservative	36%	44%	30%	33%	35%	43%	37%	37%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	249	244	261	449	431	435	446	403
born 1960-79	Labour	40%	44%	47%	46%	34%	43%	44%	44%
	Conservative	32%	36%	33%	27%	41%	35%	34%	30%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	89	104	175	268	241	348	346	388
born 1980 and after	Labour								
	Conservative								
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>								

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

Women	Party vote	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
born before 1946	Labour	36%	42%	42%	38%	41%	42%	44%	37%
	Conservative	42%	35%	33%	36%	33%	38%	33%	39%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	807	904	923	901	325	748	726	748
born 1946-59	Labour	40%	44%	46%	44%	52%	53%	50%	46%
	Conservative	34%	28%	32%	29%	28%	28%	22%	33%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	413	437	484	460	187	420	380	437
born 1960-79	Labour	47%	47%	54%	49%	48%	57%	52%	56%
	Conservative	30%	23%	21%	26%	25%	20%	23%	20%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	476	610	663	674	288	618	611	724
born 1980 and after	Labour								
	Conservative								
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>								
Women	Party vote	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
born before 1946	Labour	45%	39%	36%	33%	41%	38%	35%	31%
	Conservative	36%	37%	42%	37%	37%	39%	43%	46%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	668	692	809	596	739	691	692	699
born 1946-59	Labour	50%	43%	43%	39%	43%	33%	41%	35%
	Conservative	24%	31%	30%	33%	30%	30%	29%	36%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	453	393	554	403	526	574	501	567
born 1960-79	Labour	55%	54%	48%	43%	52%	39%	46%	36%
	Conservative	18%	20%	20%	23%	20%	26%	26%	34%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	672	730	943	669	877	845	859	946
born 1980 and after	Labour			43%	33%	47%	32%	38%	29%
	Conservative			20%	18%	16%	16%	16%	31%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>			166	135	224	262	251	329

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

Women	Party vote	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
born before 1946	Labour	33%	35%	32%	35%	31%	32%	29%	29%
	Conservative	42%	40%	44%	40%	44%	39%	48%	48%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	487	473	462	461	411	336	432	283
born 1946-59	Labour	31%	35%	33%	37%	36%	30%	31%	30%
	Conservative	34%	35%	39%	38%	33%	38%	43%	46%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	426	419	403	404	424	390	572	399
born 1960-79	Labour	38%	42%	38%	45%	46%	39%	35%	39%
	Conservative	27%	30%	29%	25%	23%	26%	35%	37%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	733	678	650	593	575	571	837	557
born 1980 and after	Labour	26%	31%	55%	49%	46%	37%	40%	41%
	Conservative	22%	25%	13%	19%	14%	19%	25%	25%
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	284	277	342	340	378	320	576	404
Women	Party vote	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
born before 1946	Labour	22%	31%	22%					
	Conservative	59%	54%	53%					
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	305	366	261					
born 1946-59	Labour	35%	35%	20%	27%	28%	32%		
	Conservative	45%	42%	42%	51%	50%	43%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	506	499	389	512	796	791		
born 1960-79	Labour	50%	42%	33%	37%	35%	45%		
	Conservative	27%	31%	32%	39%	38%	32%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	743	719	572	725	1,130	1,212		
born 1980 and after	Labour	59%	60%	40%	56%	51%	59%		
	Conservative	17%	16%	13%	18%	18%	15%		
	<i>Unweighted bases</i>	591	570	518	745	1,224	1,459		

Table A.4 Gender gap in partisan identification, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

Gender gap*	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991
born before 1946	-7%	-5%	-7%	-3%	1%	-11%	-10%	-4%
born 1946-59	7%	-8%	8%	2%	5%	-6%	-12%	5%
born 1960-79	3%	1%	-4%	-3%	-14%	11%	-13%	0%
born 1980 and after								
Gender gap*	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
born before 1946	-16%	4%	-8%	-6%	5%	-8%	6%	-3%
born 1946-59	5%	-1%	-15%	-12%	8%	-3%	8%	0%
born 1960-79	8%	8%	8%	0%	1%	14%	-3%	12%
born 1980 and after								
Gender gap*	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
born before 1946	-16%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-2%	-3%	-13%	-2%
born 1946-59	8%	2%	-9%	0%	3%	-8%	-5%	3%
born 1960-79	10%	5%	8%	14%	8%	-3%	7%	10%
born 1980 and after			8%	17%	-6%	0%	3%	2%
Gender gap*	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
born before 1946	-1%	4%	-3%	-2%	-4%	4%	4%	12%
born 1946-59	-6%	-7%	-11%	-3%	1%	-5%	-3%	0%
born 1960-79	18%	16%	3%	7%	13%	5%	-1%	7%
born 1980 and after	14%	5%	17%	11%	11%	4%	8%	10%
Gender gap*	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
born before 1946	-7%	6%	-8%					
born 1946-59	-13%	0%	-6%	-7%	6%	4%		
born 1960-79	17%	5%	3%	7%	5%	4%		
born 1980 and after	14%	13%	12%	16%	6%	11%		

* A gender gap above 0 indicates higher support for the Labour Party among women than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates higher support for the Conservative Party for women of a particular generation

Table A.5 Left-right values, by sex, 1986-2022

	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1995	1996	1998	1999
Men	36%	37%	35%	36%	39%	35%	34%	33%	36%	37%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	593	1146	1164	1080	1159	539	1320	1320	1014	1071
Women	40%	38%	36%	37%	37%	37%	34%	36%	38%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	695	1275	1381	1300	1367	735	1750	1717	1462	1332
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Men	37%	38%	36%	37%	42%	41%	40%	40%	39%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1248	1207	1263	1558	1110	1515	1631	1507	1663	1257
Women	39%	40%	39%	39%	42%	42%	42%	42%	40%	41%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1699	1549	1563	1973	1441	1981	2064	1974	2239	1619
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Men	40%	39%	36%	37%	37%	37%	36%	37%	35%	38%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1200	1229	1221	1243	1012	1568	1016	1434	1289	1167
Women	42%	40%	38%	39%	39%	40%	38%	39%	39%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1531	1570	1563	1518	1329	2029	1334	1772	1731	1412
	2020	2021	2022							
Men	36%	33%	32%							
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1776	2725	2923							
Women	36%	35%	33%							
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2160	3447	3729							

Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

Table A.6 Gender gaps in left-right values, by generation, 1986-2022

	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1995	1996	1998	1999
Men*										
born before 1946	38%	36%	34%	36%	38%	32%	33%	33%	34%	37%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	322	616	596	540	570	221	558	530	392	444
born 1946-59	36%	37%	37%	36%	39%	35%	34%	32%	37%	38%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	168	319	302	292	313	167	356	345	256	253
born 1960-79	34%	36%	37%	35%	39%	38%	34%	33%	37%	37%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	103	211	264	247	274	150	404	441	355	354
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Women*										
born before 1946	40%	39%	37%	37%	37%	34%	33%	37%	37%	38%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	358	680	684	613	660	321	749	733	561	536
born 1946-59	41%	38%	37%	39%	38%	38%	35%	35%	37%	36%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	205	381	390	385	361	187	411	411	362	307
born 1960-79	40%	36%	34%	35%	37%	39%	34%	37%	40%	42%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	129	211	301	295	341	225	588	569	519	465
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	2%	3%	3%	1%	-1%	2%	0%	4%	4%	1%
born 1946-59	5%	0%	0%	2%	-1%	2%	1%	3%	0%	-1%
born 1960-79	6%	0%	-2%	0%	-2%	1%	0%	4%	3%	4%
born 1980 and after										

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more right-wing than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more left-wing than men in a particular generation

Table A.6 Gender gaps in left-right values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Men*										
born before 1946	36%	35%	34%	35%	40%	39%	38%	39%	37%	37%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	468	433	406	531	334	499	473	459	482	307
born 1946-59	37%	40%	37%	35%	41%	41%	39%	37%	37%	38%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	289	288	307	419	308	419	386	361	401	326
born 1960-79	37%	40%	37%	39%	44%	42%	42%	41%	40%	41%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	452	442	470	525	392	492	605	547	597	474
born 1980 and after				40%	44%	43%	42%	41%	42%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>				83	76	105	166	140	182	149
Women*										
born before 1946	38%	38%	36%	36%	40%	41%	39%	40%	38%	38%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	627	539	532	640	474	606	578	573	590	380
born 1946-59	37%	39%	39%	37%	42%	40%	40%	41%	39%	39%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	397	391	338	463	336	459	506	449	518	381
born 1960-79	40%	41%	40%	41%	43%	43%	45%	43%	42%	42%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	623	566	609	750	527	734	750	745	840	624
born 1980 and after				40%	42%	43%	41%	43%	43%	41%
<i>Unweighted base</i>				119	102	182	227	205	277	233
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	2%	4%	2%	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
born 1946-59	1%	-2%	1%	2%	1%	-1%	1%	4%	1%	2%
born 1960-79	3%	1%	2%	2%	-1%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%
born 1980 and after				1%	-1%	0%	-1%	2%	2%	2%

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more right-wing than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more left-wing than men in a particular generation

Table A.6 Gender gaps in left-right values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Men*										
born before 1946	39%	39%	35%	37%	39%	38%	39%	37%	38%	37%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	310	279	302	271	242	313	193	248	203	164
born 1946-59	39%	36%	36%	36%	37%	35%	36%	36%	35%	36%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	295	320	337	317	248	395	277	375	354	322
born 1960-79	40%	41%	37%	37%	37%	37%	36%	37%	35%	38%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	433	447	427	439	360	524	332	483	422	382
born 1980 and after	40%	39%	38%	38%	37%	36%	37%	38%	34%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	160	183	155	214	162	336	214	320	302	295
Women*										
born before 1946	41%	37%	37%	38%	38%	38%	37%	39%	39%	41%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	359	358	386	334	261	355	221	237	293	201
born 1946-59	40%	37%	38%	37%	38%	38%	37%	39%	40%	39%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	366	353	364	365	341	500	346	439	423	339
born 1960-79	43%	42%	39%	40%	38%	40%	39%	38%	40%	41%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	563	564	518	498	479	700	448	612	569	455
born 1980 and after	42%	42%	37%	39%	42%	41%	40%	39%	38%	38%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	239	292	291	320	245	471	315	459	429	404
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	2%	-2%	2%	1%	-1%	-1%	-2%	2%	0%	3%
born 1946-59	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	3%	5%	3%
born 1960-79	3%	1%	2%	3%	1%	3%	3%	1%	5%	3%
born 1980 and after	2%	2%	0%	2%	6%	5%	3%	2%	4%	-1%

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more right-wing than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more left-wing than men in a particular generation

Table A.6 Gender gaps in left-right values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	2020	2021	2022							
Men*										
born before 1946										
<i>Unweighted bases</i>										
born 1946-59	37%	38%	36%							
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	534	781	770							
born 1960-79	36%	34%	31%							
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	585	907	987							
born 1980 and after	33%	30%	29%							
<i>Unweighted base</i>	482	802	928							
Women*										
born before 1946										
<i>Unweighted bases</i>										
born 1946-59	38%	35%	36%							
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	522	819	809							
born 1960-79	37%	35%	35%							
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	740	1,163	1,235							
born 1980 and after	33%	33%	30%							
<i>Unweighted base</i>	748	1,237	1,471							
Gender gap**										
born before 1946										
born 1946-59	1%	-2%	0%							
born 1960-79	1%	2%	4%							
born 1980 and after	0%	2%	1%							

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the left-right scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed a right-wing view. A score of 50% equates to expressing a right-wing view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more right-wing than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more left-wing than men in a particular generation

Table A.7 Libertarian-authoritarian values, by sex, 1986-2022

	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998
Men	69%	72%	70%	68%	63%	73%	68%	70%	68%	73%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	594	590	1164	1072	561	535	1254	1309	1303	1009
Women	70%	69%	69%	67%	63%	72%	67%	68%	68%	70%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	703	662	1384	1301	655	736	1580	1729	1690	1454
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Men	72%	68%	69%	69%	69%	69%	70%	69%	70%	71%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1066	1237	1195	1256	1539	1099	1499	1613	1497	1658
Women	70%	68%	66%	67%	67%	68%	69%	68%	69%	68%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1329	1678	1519	1539	1943	1411	1956	2033	1966	2212
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Men	70%	69%	70%	69%	69%	65%	65%	65%	63%	61%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1244	1189	1225	1215	1236	1010	1564	1009	1427	1282
Women	68%	67%	70%	68%	67%	66%	64%	62%	62%	61%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1608	1506	1564	1552	1508	1317	2013	1325	1762	1711
	2019	2020	2021	2022						
Men	64%	59%	58%	58%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1167	1771	2716	2892						
Women	62%	59%	58%	57%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1406	2144	3420	3709						

Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

Table A.8 Gender gaps in libertarian-authoritarian values, by generation, 1986-2022

	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998
Men*										
born before 1946	75%	76%	75%	73%	69%	77%	74%	73%	74%	76%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	322	320	597	535	278	217	513	556	530	393
born 1946-59	65%	69%	67%	68%	61%	70%	65%	68%	66%	72%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	167	162	299	291	153	165	351	357	344	259
born 1960-79	59%	63%	64%	61%	56%	70%	63%	67%	65%	71%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	104	107	265	245	130	152	387	403	441	355
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Women*										
born before 1946	75%	73%	73%	72%	67%	76%	72%	72%	72%	75%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	361	348	685	612	332	320	699	752	737	565
born 1946-59	66%	66%	66%	64%	61%	71%	64%	67%	67%	67%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	206	201	390	386	164	187	374	414	413	363
born 1960-79	62%	65%	64%	63%	58%	67%	63%	65%	64%	68%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	129	109	301	295	156	225	499	588	569	521
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	0%	-3%	-2%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-2%	-1%	-2%	-1%
born 1946-59	1%	-3%	0%	-4%	-1%	1%	-1%	-1%	1%	-5%
born 1960-79	4%	2%	0%	1%	2%	-2%	0%	-2%	-1%	-2%
born 1980 and after										

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more authoritarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more libertarian than men in a particular generation

Table A.8 Gender gaps in libertarian-authoritarian values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Men*										
born before 1946	76%	74%	73%	73%	74%	75%	75%	73%	74%	73%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	444	467	435	411	539	336	503	473	468	487
born 1946-59	70%	66%	69%	67%	68%	69%	69%	70%	71%	69%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	255	288	288	307	424	308	419	386	366	403
born 1960-79	69%	66%	66%	68%	67%	67%	69%	67%	70%	70%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	354	451	443	471	526	393	492	606	546	603
born 1980 and after					63%	64%	62%	64%	64%	70%
<i>Unweighted base</i>					83	76	105	166	141	184
Women*										
born before 1946	75%	72%	70%	70%	72%	71%	73%	72%	73%	71%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	544	626	542	536	660	479	614	585	585	604
born 1946-59	69%	66%	64%	65%	66%	67%	70%	66%	67%	67%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	308	397	390	340	462	335	461	508	458	519
born 1960-79	67%	66%	65%	65%	65%	66%	68%	67%	68%	67%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	467	626	566	611	749	528	735	750	756	843
born 1980 and after					63%	62%	62%	67%	66%	67%
<i>Unweighted base</i>					120	103	184	227	205	278
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	-1%	-2%	-3%	-3%	-1%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-1%	-3%
born 1946-59	-2%	0%	-5%	-2%	-2%	-1%	1%	-3%	-3%	-3%
born 1960-79	-2%	0%	0%	-3%	-2%	-1%	-1%	0%	-2%	-3%
born 1980 and after					0%	-2%	1%	3%	1%	-3%

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more authoritarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more libertarian than men in a particular generation

Table A.8 Gender gaps in libertarian-authoritarian values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Men*										
born before 1946	74%	74%	75%	73%	73%	69%	69%	70%	70%	70%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	308	314	279	303	272	243	314	193	247	204
born 1946-59	70%	67%	70%	70%	70%	68%	67%	66%	64%	62%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	327	296	322	336	317	248	397	277	376	355
born 1960-79	71%	69%	70%	69%	68%	65%	66%	64%	64%	63%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	474	433	449	427	439	361	527	332	483	422
born 1980 and after	66%	64%	67%	66%	65%	61%	61%	62%	58%	57%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	149	161	184	155	214	162	336	215	320	302
Women*										
born before 1946	71%	69%	73%	70%	71%	69%	68%	67%	66%	65%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	387	365	362	387	338	263	359	223	239	294
born 1946-59	67%	66%	69%	68%	66%	67%	65%	63%	63%	63%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	383	368	355	365	370	343	504	348	441	424
born 1960-79	68%	66%	69%	68%	67%	64%	63%	60%	61%	60%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	626	562	565	520	499	481	699	448	612	568
born 1980 and after	67%	69%	68%	66%	65%	65%	63%	61%	60%	58%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	237	240	294	292	321	248	470	316	460	430
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	-3%	-5%	-2%	-3%	-3%	0%	-1%	-4%	-4%	-4%
born 1946-59	-3%	-1%	-1%	-2%	-4%	-2%	-3%	-3%	-1%	1%
born 1960-79	-3%	-3%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-2%	-4%	-3%	-3%
born 1980 and after	1%	5%	1%	0%	-1%	4%	2%	-1%	2%	1%

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more authoritarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more libertarian than men in a particular generation

Table A.8 Gender gaps in libertarian-authoritarian values, by generation, 1986-2022 (continued)

	2019	2020	2021	2022						
Men*										
born before 1946	72%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	164									
born 1946-59	67%	65%	62%	61%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	323	534	783	770						
born 1960-79	64%	63%	63%	61%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	384	585	911	987						
born 1980 and after	60%	52%	51%	54%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	296	482	803	928						
Women*										
born before 1946	67%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	204									
born 1946-59	64%	61%	61%	59%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	340	524	821	813						
born 1960-79	61%	61%	60%	59%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	454	742	1,163	1,240						
born 1980 and after	60%	55%	54%	54%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	404	749	1,243	1,479						
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	-5%									
born 1946-59	-2%	-3%	-1%	-2%						
born 1960-79	-3%	-2%	-3%	-3%						
born 1980 and after	0%	3%	3%	0%						

* Percentages indicate the average number of items on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (out of a possible five) where respondents expressed an authoritarian view. A score of 50% equates to expressing an authoritarian view in relation to an average of 2.5 of these items

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more authoritarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more libertarian than men in a particular generation

Table A.9 Disagreement that “a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”, by sex, 1984-2022

	1984	1987	1989	1990	1991	1994	1998	2002	2008	2012
Men	35%	28%	47%	48%	42%	57%	52%	59%	56%	67%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	719	599	580	1055	566	436	314	836	837	429
Women	41%	37%	58%	61%	48%	61%	63%	69%	61%	66%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	823	676	713	1303	671	524	475	1081	1105	497
	2017	2022								
Men	72%	69%								
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1078	1015								
Women	78%	75%								
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1279	1308								

Table A.10 Gender gaps in attitudes to gender roles, by generation, 1984-2022

	1984	1987	1989	1990	1991	1994	1998	2002	2008	2012
Men*										
born before 1946	23%	13%	29%	33%	20%	34%	22%	36%	32%	39%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	423	326	304	530	277	183	119	275	252	103
born 1946-59	51%	43%	64%	59%	56%	69%	60%	64%	65%	65%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	191	164	142	283	154	108	87	204	196	129
born 1960-79	50%	47%	68%	66%	66%	75%	75%	68%	63%	69%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	104	109	134	241	135	145	104	302	300	152
born 1980 and after									62%	86%
<i>Unweighted base</i>									89	45
Women*										
born before 1946	28%	22%	36%	43%	32%	38%	44%	45%	36%	44%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	482	363	343	603	345	228	188	364	296	128
born 1946-59	60%	50%	77%	74%	56%	75%	67%	74%	61%	67%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	235	201	201	387	166	127	126	238	252	102
born 1960-79	56%	59%	80%	80%	71%	77%	78%	80%	75%	72%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	98	110	166	305	158	168	155	423	412	160
born 1980 and after									71%	72%
<i>Unweighted base</i>									140	106
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	5%	9%	8%	10%	12%	4%	21%	9%	4%	5%
born 1946-59	9%	7%	13%	15%	0%	5%	7%	10%	-4%	2%
born 1960-79	7%	11%	12%	14%	6%	2%	3%	11%	12%	2%
born 1980 and after									9%	-14%

* % disagreeing that "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more gender-egalitarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more gender-traditional than men in a particular generation

Table A.10 Gender gaps in attitudes to gender roles, by generation, 1984-2022 (continued)

	2017	2022								
Men*										
born before 1946	52%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	186									
born 1946-59	72%	65%								
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	271	281								
born 1960-79	77%	72%								
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	370	342								
born 1980 and after	73%	72%								
<i>Unweighted base</i>	246	317								
Women*										
born before 1946	59%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	169									
born 1946-59	78%	77%								
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	306	275								
born 1960-79	83%	78%								
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	449	424								
born 1980 and after	81%	76%								
<i>Unweighted base</i>	337	538								
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	7%									
born 1946-59	6%	12%								
born 1960-79	6%	5%								
born 1980 and after	8%	4%								

* % disagreeing that "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more gender-egalitarian than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are more gender-traditional than men in a particular generation

Table A.11 Proportion wanting the government to increase taxes and spend more, by sex, 1983-2022

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994
Men	32%	44%	49%	50%	49%	57%	58%	66%	67%	62%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	780	749	775	1366	1270	1336	1208	1254	1190	1445
Women	36%	40%	47%	48%	55%	60%	57%	68%	65%	60%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	893	827	916	1560	1448	1562	1443	1564	1628	1850
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Men	61%	61%	61%	64%	61%	50%	60%	61%	50%	50%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1493	1529	539	1299	1350	938	1375	1481	1388	909
Women	65%	61%	67%	65%	60%	55%	63%	67%	56%	52%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1992	1964	756	1757	1665	1237	1790	1852	1728	1149
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Men	46%	45%	40%	38%	33%	29%	37%	35%	35%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	936	1366	1310	913	487	1382	1405	1375	1405	1208
Women	50%	52%	47%	42%	38%	35%	37%	38%	39%	39%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1134	1719	1633	1231	611	1768	1776	1681	1713	1537
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		
Men	46%	49%	60%	58%	52%	50%	51%	57%		
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1394	1253	1277	1176	1390	1767	898	1114		
Women	48%	52%	64%	61%	59%	52%	55%	54%		
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1773	1583	1574	1579	1674	2127	1115	1281		

% selecting the government should "Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits"

Table A.12 Gender gaps in attitudes to public spending, by generation, 1983-2022

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1989	1990	1991	1993	1994
Men*										
born before 1946	32%	43%	46%	51%	48%	55%	58%	66%	66%	64%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	475	444	415	745	677	693	614	626	497	604
born 1946-59	34%	50%	51%	51%	54%	61%	63%	68%	71%	66%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	218	193	218	373	352	331	311	331	370	401
born 1960-79	25%	35%	55%	45%	47%	56%	51%	66%	64%	58%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	87	110	141	248	241	310	281	293	320	438
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Women*										
born before 1946	36%	36%	45%	48%	52%	61%	58%	65%	61%	59%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	569	488	496	879	797	801	686	787	763	852
born 1946-59	39%	44%	50%	52%	63%	63%	64%	73%	76%	61%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	238	233	249	427	414	420	418	394	396	417
born 1960-79	29%	48%	50%	40%	52%	56%	46%	67%	60%	61%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	83	97	169	251	232	334	330	375	460	574
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	4%	-7%	-1%	-3%	4%	6%	0%	-1%	-5%	-5%
born 1946-59	5%	-6%	-1%	1%	10%	2%	1%	5%	4%	-5%
born 1960-79	4%	13%	-5%	-5%	6%	0%	-5%	1%	-4%	3%
born 1980 and after										

* % selecting the government should "Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more likely to favour spending and taxation than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less likely to favour taxation and spending than men in a particular generation

Table A.12 Gender gaps in attitudes to public spending, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Men*										
born before 1946	64%	60%	65%	65%	63%	56%	64%	66%	54%	54%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	626	606	208	504	535	342	487	475	464	274
born 1946-59	68%	68%	66%	69%	67%	53%	67%	65%	54%	55%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	382	399	140	321	316	218	325	339	344	247
born 1960-79	52%	57%	53%	60%	55%	47%	55%	58%	47%	46%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	480	518	191	460	466	341	508	574	504	322
born 1980 and after									35%	40%
<i>Unweighted base</i>									76	66
Women*										
born before 1946	64%	63%	69%	62%	62%	58%	69%	67%	59%	55%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	886	858	303	719	698	471	641	663	565	391
born 1946-59	72%	67%	73%	72%	65%	59%	68%	73%	63%	54%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	462	448	182	414	364	273	441	382	384	257
born 1960-79	62%	57%	62%	63%	54%	52%	56%	66%	55%	47%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	640	651	271	600	572	449	639	709	663	420
born 1980 and after									36%	52%
<i>Unweighted base</i>									116	78
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	0%	3%	4%	-3%	-1%	2%	5%	1%	5%	1%
born 1946-59	4%	-1%	7%	3%	-2%	6%	1%	8%	9%	-1%
born 1960-79	10%	-1%	9%	3%	-1%	5%	1%	8%	7%	1%
born 1980 and after									1%	12%

* % selecting the government should "Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more likely to favour spending and taxation than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less likely to favour taxation and spending than men in a particular generation

Table A.12 Gender gaps in attitudes to public spending, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Men*										
born before 1946	48%	48%	45%	40%	40%	32%	40%	38%	32%	36%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	308	376	398	266	108	369	323	337	309	275
born 1946-59	48%	53%	47%	42%	40%	35%	41%	39%	39%	49%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	241	327	290	214	121	331	355	365	350	296
born 1960-79	45%	43%	38%	39%	35%	28%	39%	36%	36%	39%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	320	513	494	330	190	498	506	486	494	428
born 1980 and after	41%	30%	28%	31%	16%	24%	28%	29%	32%	32%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	67	148	128	103	68	181	220	187	250	208
Women*										
born before 1946	56%	57%	50%	47%	46%	42%	39%	46%	37%	43%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	367	487	498	348	153	444	439	437	396	319
born 1946-59	53%	54%	56%	47%	42%	38%	41%	43%	45%	43%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	251	419	346	274	135	403	390	383	414	370
born 1960-79	49%	49%	45%	39%	34%	32%	34%	35%	38%	42%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	415	623	603	438	240	654	619	537	544	538
born 1980 and after	30%	46%	34%	36%	30%	27%	35%	32%	35%	30%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	100	188	183	162	83	263	324	320	355	306
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	8%	9%	4%	7%	6%	10%	-1%	8%	5%	7%
born 1946-59	5%	2%	9%	4%	2%	3%	1%	3%	6%	-5%
born 1960-79	4%	6%	7%	1%	-1%	5%	-5%	0%	2%	2%
born 1980 and after	-11%	16%	6%	5%	13%	4%	6%	3%	3%	-2%

* % selecting the government should "Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more likely to favour spending and taxation than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less likely to favour taxation and spending than men in a particular generation

Table A.12 Gender gaps in attitudes to public spending, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021			
Men*										
born before 1946	49%	60%	65%	61%	67%					
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	274	238	208	188	208					
born 1946-59	51%	54%	68%	70%	67%	61%	65%			
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	342	314	340	302	352	530	248			
born 1960-79	45%	48%	60%	61%	56%	45%	44%			
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	468	427	429	404	466	581	279			
born 1980 and after	44%	42%	52%	47%	37%	45%	46%			
<i>Unweighted base</i>	310	273	291	272	354	481	288			
Women*										
born before 1946	45%	62%	61%	68%	68%					
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	297	272	222	272	248					
born 1946-59	54%	59%	68%	74%	71%	69%	67%			
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	435	385	369	367	377	519	250			
born 1960-79	48%	52%	67%	60%	62%	49%	55%			
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	610	537	523	508	543	722	369			
born 1980 and after	43%	42%	60%	50%	48%	41%	46%			
<i>Unweighted base</i>	427	382	436	408	483	737	425			
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	-4%	2%	-5%	6%	1%					
born 1946-59	3%	4%	0%	5%	4%	7%	2%			
born 1960-79	4%	5%	7%	-1%	7%	4%	11%			
born 1980 and after	-1%	0%	8%	3%	10%	-4%	0%			

* % selecting the government should "Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits"

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women are more likely to favour spending and taxation than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less likely to favour taxation and spending than men in a particular generation

Table A.13 Proportion wanting to stay in the European Union with no change in its powers, by sex, 1983-2022

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Men	22%	16%	19%	20%	16%	21%	18%	15%	20%	20%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	598	474	481	466	521	396	454	950	449	1464
Women	26%	27%	24%	21%	24%	28%	25%	27%	27%	30%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	710	595	659	591	651	516	524	1141	545	1686
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017
Men	26%	19%	22%	24%	24%	13%	19%	16%	17%	17%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	955	1330	1801	442	483	498	914	441	495	900
Women	32%	30%	31%	34%	29%	21%	22%	22%	23%	23%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1133	1594	2051	536	550	536	1039	483	543	1017
	2018	2019	2020	2021						
Men	20%	19%	22%	20%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1247	473	592	425						
Women	23%	25%	21%	24%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1525	560	699	538						

Table A.14 Gender gaps in attitudes to the European Union, by generation, 1983-2022

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Men*										
born before 1946	21%	17%	15%	15%	17%	12%	14%	13%	15%	16%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>251</i>	<i>183</i>	<i>204</i>	<i>188</i>	<i>199</i>	<i>158</i>	<i>177</i>	<i>369</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>478</i>
born 1946-59	20%	13%	19%	23%	14%	21%	11%	13%	17%	11%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>151</i>	<i>129</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>136</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>219</i>	<i>116</i>	<i>337</i>
born 1960-79	27%	18%	23%	21%	18%	32%	28%	16%	24%	23%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>158</i>	<i>139</i>	<i>146</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>132</i>	<i>144</i>	<i>327</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>559</i>
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Women*										
born before 1946	27%	25%	20%	15%	22%	21%	20%	23%	28%	26%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>343</i>	<i>258</i>	<i>276</i>	<i>260</i>	<i>268</i>	<i>213</i>	<i>228</i>	<i>458</i>	<i>202</i>	<i>605</i>
born 1946-59	25%	29%	19%	21%	28%	26%	26%	23%	21%	20%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>181</i>	<i>141</i>	<i>153</i>	<i>144</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>123</i>	<i>242</i>	<i>121</i>	<i>361</i>
born 1960-79	27%	28%	32%	29%	24%	37%	30%	32%	30%	36%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	<i>182</i>	<i>194</i>	<i>229</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>223</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>162</i>	<i>414</i>	<i>199</i>	<i>631</i>
born 1980 and after										
<i>Unweighted base</i>										
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	6%	8%	5%	0%	5%	9%	6%	11%	13%	10%
born 1946-59	4%	16%	0%	-2%	14%	5%	15%	10%	4%	9%
born 1960-79	0%	9%	9%	8%	6%	5%	2%	16%	6%	13%
born 1980 and after										

* Proportion wanting to stay in the EU with no change in its powers

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women more in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation

Table A.14 Gender gaps in attitudes to the European Union, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017
Men*										
born before 1946	16%	15%	15%	22%	10%	7%	10%	8%	14%	9%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	304	400	588	129	139	119	212	98	92	170
born 1946-59	25%	18%	18%	22%	19%	14%	11%	11%	7%	16%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	263	360	481	112	108	144	237	104	138	209
born 1960-79	32%	20%	25%	21%	27%	15%	19%	10%	16%	14%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	334	469	587	150	177	176	309	158	154	297
born 1980 and after	42%	31%	33%	39%	42%	12%	30%	30%	27%	22%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	54	100	145	51	58	59	155	80	111	218
Women*										
born before 1946	25%	21%	21%	26%	18%	10%	16%	10%	13%	10%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	376	536	642	154	132	150	238	98	95	138
born 1946-59	25%	24%	27%	22%	22%	11%	13%	17%	13%	12%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	262	368	477	133	129	109	270	113	149	238
born 1960-79	36%	38%	35%	40%	29%	17%	21%	20%	25%	22%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	412	574	749	189	218	170	316	170	181	349
born 1980 and after	57%	41%	47%	50%	53%	42%	36%	33%	35%	36%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	83	111	182	59	69	105	214	98	117	281
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	9%	6%	6%	4%	8%	3%	6%	2%	-1%	2%
born 1946-59	0%	6%	9%	1%	4%	-3%	2%	6%	6%	-4%
born 1960-79	4%	18%	11%	19%	2%	2%	2%	10%	9%	9%
born 1980 and after	14%	10%	14%	11%	11%	30%	6%	2%	8%	14%

* Proportion wanting to stay in the EU with no change in its powers

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women more in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation

Table A.14 Gender gaps in attitudes to the European Union, by generation, 1983-2022 (continued)

	2018	2019	2020	2021						
Men*										
born before 1946	11%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	193									
born 1946-59	9%	6%	15%	11%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	314	131	194	121						
born 1960-79	17%	16%	18%	12%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	424	146	199	130						
born 1980 and after	31%	33%	31%	32%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	303	114	143	134						
Women*										
born before 1946	12%									
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	256									
born 1946-59	13%	10%	17%	11%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	358	136	172	126						
born 1960-79	21%	26%	18%	19%						
<i>Unweighted bases</i>	496	170	239	170						
born 1980 and after	37%	39%	28%	36%						
<i>Unweighted base</i>	398	161	238	207						
Gender gap**										
born before 1946	1%									
born 1946-59	4%	5%	2%	0%						
born 1960-79	4%	10%	0%	7%						
born 1980 and after	6%	6%	-3%	4%						

* Proportion wanting to stay in the EU with no change in its powers

** A gender gap above 0 indicates that women more in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation. A gender gap below 0 indicates that women are less in favour of staying in the EU than men in a particular generation

Logistic regression

The dependent variable is whether the respondent identified with the Labour Party vs. whether they identified with the Conservative Party. Positive coefficients indicate higher levels of Labour support vs. the Conservatives at higher levels of the variable or relative to the reference category (shown in brackets). We included an interaction term between gender and survey year to measure how the gender gap changes over time. We use a linear term for year here for ease of interpretation; there is of course not a straightforward linear trend in the gender gap in party identification as shown in Figure.3; however, a linear term for year captures any general change over the time period.

The negative coefficient for woman in the first model indicates that women are less supportive of Labour vs. the Conservatives relative to men in the first year of the time series (here 1995), as we would expect. The positive coefficient for Women*Year (the interaction) indicates that women become more supportive of Labour vs. the Conservatives over time relative to men over time, also as we would expect. Unfortunately, we cannot include pre-1995 years in the analysis because the question about the EU is not available in these years. Whilst this means we do exclude the period where there is consistently a gender gap where women are more supportive of the Conservatives (see Figure.3), we do include nearly 30 years over which the 'modern' gender gap has become more consistent and larger in size.

In the next three models (Models 2, 3 and 4), we added measures of left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values (Model 2), then spending preferences (Model 3), then attitudes towards the EU (Model 4). If the interaction term changes with the inclusion of each of these measures, we can say that the change in the gender gap over time is associated with gender differences in these values and attitudes. Unsurprisingly, however, given the small differences identified in the descriptive analysis, we see that adding each of these sets of measures makes only a marginal difference to the women*year interaction term. Whilst it becomes statistically insignificant in all subsequent models, it is of the same magnitude as that seen in the first column and thus we do not interpret this as strong evidence that these values and attitudes are strongly associated with change in the gender gap over time.

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Woman (man)	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value	-0.189 (0.051)** 0.001	-0.196 (0.051)** 0.001	-0.203 (0.051)** 0.001	-0.175 (0.051)** 0.004
Year	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value	-0.016 (0.002)** 0.000	-0.013 (0.002)** 0.000	-0.012 (0.002)** 0.00	-0.012 (0.003)** 0.000
Women*Year	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value	0.007 (0.003)* 0.036	0.006 (0.003) 0.063	0.006 (0.003) 0.061	0.006 (0.003) 0.106
Left right values	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value		0.217 (0.019)** 0.000	0.229 (0.019)** 0.000	0.204 (0.019)** 0.000
Libertarian-authoritarian values	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value		0.150 (0.020)** 0.000	0.160 (0.020)** 0.000	0.148 (0.021)** 0.000
Tax-spend (tax and spend less/keep it the same)	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value			0.109 (0.029)** (0.029)**	
Europe preferences (Leave EU)	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value				
Stay and reduce EU power	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value				0.205 (0.038)** 0.000
Leave relationship as it is	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value				-0.039 (0.043) 0.358
Stay and increase EU power	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value				0.097 (0.055) 0.080
Single European government	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value				-0.051 (0.067) 0.447
_cons	Co-efficient Standard Error P-value	1.001 (0.055)** 0.000	-0.125 (0.106) 0.238	-0.263 (0.112)* 0.019	-0.185 (0.120) 0.124
Unweighted base		22,306	22,306	22,306	22,306
Weighted base		22,374	22,374	22,374	22,374

** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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